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Transnational	  oil	  and	  gas	  pipelines	  have	  a	  troublesome	  history	  of	  
disagreements	  and	  disputes	  that	  in	  many	  cases	  have	  led	  to	  a	  
cessation	  of	  supply.	  While	  geopolitics	  and	  weak	  international	  
institutions	  are	  often	  pointed	  to	  as	  explanations,	  considering	  
pipelines	  as	  social	  as	  well	  as	  material	  constructs	  can	  also	  shed	  
light	  on	  why	  disputes	  emerge.	  This	  paper	  will	  consider	  the	  social	  
construction	  of	  the	  Myanmar-­‐China	  pipelines.	  In	  China,	  the	  
pipelines	  are	  seen	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  China’s	  ‘Malacca	  dilemma’.	  In	  
Myanmar,	  the	  changing	  political	  situation	  has	  allowed	  new	  actors	  
to	  contest	  the	  military	  junta’s	  narrative	  of	  economic	  development	  
and	  the	  pipelines	  have	  become	  a	  lightning	  rod	  for	  national	  
conversations	  about	  local	  resource	  ownership,	  social	  and	  
environmental	  norms	  and	  Chinese	  exploitation	  of	  Myanmar’s	  
energy	  resources.	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1	  
Introduction	   	  	  Transnational	  oil	  and	  gas	  pipelines	  are	  an	  increasingly	  important	  feature	  of	  international	  relations	  but	  they	  have	  a	  history	  of	  conflict,	  disagreement	  and	  disputes	  that	  in	  many	  cases	  has	  led	  to	  cessations	  in	  supply.	  In	  light	  of	  this	  much	  of	  the	  academic	  literature	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  oil	  and	  gas	  pipelines	  on	  international	  relations	  points	  to	  them	  as	  a	  source	  of	  conflict	  or	  geopolitical	  tension	  (Stevens,	  2003;	  Balmaceda,	  2006;	  Stevens,	  2009	  Chicilnisky-­‐Heal,	  2009;	  Freifield,	  2009;)	  and	  this	  is	  commonly	  attributed	  to	  economic	  issues	  such	  as	  changes	  in	  pricing	  and	  disagreement	  over	  transit	  terms	  (Stevens,	  2009),	  weak	  international	  rules	  of	  investment	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  third	  party	  arbitration	  (Chicilnisky-­‐Heal,	  2009;	  Stevens,	  2009),	  changes	  in	  relative	  bargaining	  positions	  (Omunbude,	  2012)	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  fixed	  nature	  of	  pipelines	  makes	  energy	  competition	  a	  ‘zero-­‐sum	  game’	  (Freifield,	  2009).	  	  	  What	  these	  perspectives	  have	  in	  common	  is	  a	  shared	  focus	  on	  material	  and	  institutional	  factors	  in	  explaining	  why	  conflict	  or	  cooperation	  results	  from	  oil	  and	  gas	  pipelines.	  The	  interests	  of	  the	  state	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  fixed	  and	  natural.	  This	  overlooks	  the	  role	  of	  identity,	  culture	  and	  other	  ideational	  factors	  in	  forming	  a	  state’s	  interests	  with	  respect	  to	  pipelines	  and	  the	  possibility	  that	  such	  interests	  are	  contestable.	  This	  paper	  will	  use	  a	  constructivist	  framework	  of	  analysis	  to	  consider	  how	  actors,	  operating	  in	  distinct	  social	  environments,	  have	  assigned	  meanings	  to	  pipelines	  and	  what	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  is	  in	  understanding	  disputes.	  	  	  As	  a	   transportation	  medium	  for	  oil	  and	  gas,	   transnational	  pipelines	  are	  a	  physical	   feature	   of	   international	   relations.	   They	   are	   permanent	   material	  structures	   that	   facilitate	   trade	   and	   connect	   one	   locality	   to	   another.	   But	  pipelines	   are	   also	   social	   structures.	   They	   have	   different	  meanings	   to	   the	  different	  actors	  involved.	  A	  pipeline	  may	  signify	  a	  commercial	  opportunity	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for	  one	  state	  and	  a	  way	  to	  diversify	  energy	  import	  routes	  for	  another.	  The	  same	   pipeline	   might	   come	   to	   mean	   independence	   for	   one	   country	   and	  over-­‐dependence	  for	  those	  that	  it	  supplies.	  	  	  As	   this	  case	  study	  on	   the	  China-­‐Myanmar	  oil	  and	  gas	  pipeline	  shows,	   the	  meanings	   assigned	   to	   oil	   and	   gas	   pipelines	   are	   important	   for	  understanding	  why	   they	   are	   built	   and	   for	   explaining	  why	   problems	  may	  occur.	   China’s	   energy	   insecurities	   stem	   from	   the	   historical	   experience	   of	  energy	   shortages	   imposed	  by	   foreigners.	   Instead	  of	   focusing	  on	   reducing	  oil	  dependency,	  or	  building	   international	  regimes	  to	  cooperate	  on	  energy	  security,	   China	   has	   pursued	   a	   state-­‐centric	   approach	   that	   privileges	  diversification	  and	  security	  of	  supply.	  Within	  a	  debate	  and	  decision	  making	  process	  dominated	  by	  powerful	  state	  interests	  the	  China-­‐Myanmar	  oil	  and	  gas	   pipelines	   were	   considered	   the	   appropriate	   way	   to	   mitigate	   China’s	  perceived	   ‘Malacca	   dilemma’	   in	   spite	   of	   weak	   security	   and	   economic	  rationale.	  	  Myanmar1,	   long	  an	  international	  pariah	  and	  rentier	  state	  that	  saw	  energy	  exports	  as	  a	  means	  to	  keep	  the	  junta’s	  head	  above	  water,	  is	  in	  a	  transitional	  phase	   that	   has	   given	   a	   greater	   amount	   of	   actors	   the	   ability	   to	   contest	  norms	   and	   shape	   energy	   priorities.	   Within	   this	   changing	   culture	   new	  actors	   have	   emerged	   that	   have	   contested	   the	   pipelines’	   meaning,	  embedding	   it	   in	  national	  discussions	   about	   local	   ownership	  of	   resources,	  social	   and	   environmental	   norms	   and	   Chinese	   exploitation	   of	   Myanmar’s	  energy	  assets.	  This	  changing	  culture	  has	  caused	  the	  government	  to	  cancel,	  suspend	  and	  renegotiate	  a	  number	  of	  Chinese	  projects	  in	  Myanmar	  and	  it	  has	  heightened	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  dispute	  over	  the	  Myanmar-­‐China	  pipelines.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Burma	  was	  renamed	  Myanmar	  in	  1989.	  This	  thesis	  will	  use	  the	  name	  Burma	  to	  describe	  the	  country	  before	  this	  time	  and	  Myanmar	  after.	  	  2BP,	  "Bp	  Energy	  Outlook	  2035	  "(2014).	  3	  International	  Energy	  Agency	  (IEA),	  "World	  Energy	  Investment	  Outlook	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1.	  The	  Pipeline	  Problem	  	  	  	  	  
	  Energy	  industry	  predictions	  indicate	  that	  transnational	  pipelines	  will	  become	  a	  more	  important	  medium	  for	  global	  energy	  trade.	  According	  to	  the	  2014	  BP	  Energy	  Outlook,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  41%	  increase	  in	  global	  energy	  consumption	  by	  2035	  with	  95%	  of	  that	  growth	  coming	  from	  emerging	  economies	  .	  While	  renewables	  are	  expected	  to	  account	  for	  some	  of	  that	  growth,	  fossil	  fuels	  are	  still	  predicted	  to	  make	  up	  81%	  of	  global	  energy	  consumption	  in	  2035.2	  Some	  of	  the	  largest	  drivers	  of	  energy	  consumption	  growth	  will	  be	  net	  energy	  importers	  such	  as	  China	  and	  India	  meaning	  there	  will	  be	  a	  continual	  need	  for	  new	  transportation	  infrastructure	  to	  bring	  product	  to	  market.	  In	  2014	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  developing	  countries	  outside	  the	  OECD	  used	  more	  oil	  than	  the	  wealthy	  countries	  inside	  it	  and	  in	  2015	  Asia	  is	  expected	  to	  use	  more	  oil	  than	  the	  Americas.3	  	  The	  International	  Energy	  Agency	  predicts	  that	  by	  2035	  $3.6	  trillion	  in	  investment	  will	  be	  required	  for	  oil	  and	  gas	  transportation	  and	  two	  thirds	  of	  this	  will	  be	  spent	  in	  non-­‐OECD	  countries.	  Approximately	  52%	  of	  this	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  required	  on	  building	  gas	  pipelines	  and	  19%	  on	  oil	  pipelines.4	  	  But	  as	  well	  as	  the	  driving	  forces	  of	  supply	  and	  demand	  there	  are	  other	  reasons	  that	  pipelines	  are	  constructed.	  	  
1.1 Motivations	  for	  Pipelines	  
	  Pipelines	  involve	  different	  actors	  who	  have	  different	  interests.	  Three	  examples	  of	  different	  interests	  are	  commercial,	  energy	  security	  and	  economic	  integration.	  	  	  1.1.1	  Commercial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2BP,	  "Bp	  Energy	  Outlook	  2035	  "(2014).	  3	  International	  Energy	  Agency	  (IEA),	  "World	  Energy	  Investment	  Outlook	  2014	  Special	  Report,"(2014),	  11.	  4	  Ibid	  p.70	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  Commercial	  motivation	  is	  one	  of	  the	  major	  drivers	  of	  transnational	  pipelines.	  It	  is	  more	  common	  for	  gas	  pipelines	  to	  be	  motivated	  by	  purely	  commercial	  considerations	  than	  oil	  pipelines	  because	  while	  gas	  is	  cheaper	  to	  transfer	  via	  pipeline,	  oil	  is	  typically	  more	  cost	  effective	  to	  transfer	  via	  tanker.	  Approximately	  93%	  of	  the	  world’s	  gas	  is	  transferred	  through	  pipelines	  while	  oil	  is	  predominately	  shipped	  by	  an	  international	  fleet	  of	  around	  38,000	  tankers.5	  	  Shipping	  gas	  is	  expensive	  because	  it	  has	  to	  first	  go	  through	  the	  liquefaction	  process	  to	  become	  liquid	  natural	  gas	  (LNG)	  although	  changing	  technology	  is	  making	  this	  more	  feasible	  as	  time	  goes	  on.	  It	  is	  geographical	  constraints	  that	  typically	  make	  pipelines	  a	  more	  attractive	  option	  for	  oil.	  	  Landlocked	  countries	  for	  example,	  which	  don’t	  have	  the	  option	  of	  shipping	  oil	  or	  LNG,	  would	  otherwise	  face	  the	  high	  costs	  of	  shipping	  via	  road	  or	  rail.	  New	  pipelines	  continue	  to	  be	  built	  for	  this	  reason	  and	  emerging	  producers	  who	  are	  landlocked	  include	  Kurdistan,	  South	  Sudan,	  Tajikistan	  and	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  the	  Congo.	  	  	  While	  commercial	  motivations	  appear	  rational	  and	  materialistic	  they	  can	  also	  have	  an	  important	  ideational	  aspect.	  For	  example	  the	  Chad-­‐Cameroon	  oil	  pipeline	  project	  that	  was	  finished	  in	  2003	  relied	  heavily	  on	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  To	  the	  World	  Bank	  the	  project	  was	  about	  poverty	  alleviation	  and	  a	  number	  of	  revenue	  conditions	  were	  assigned	  to	  the	  bank’s	  financing	  of	  the	  project.	  A	  dispute	  emerged	  when	  Chad	  started	  spending	  the	  money	  on	  weapons	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  decided	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  project	  altogether.6	  Here	  conceptions	  of	  economic	  development	  conflicted	  resulting	  in	  a	  dispute.	  	  	  1.1.2	  Energy	  Security	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Salee	  H	  Ali,	  "Energizing	  Peace:	  The	  Role	  of	  Pipelines	  in	  Regional	  Cooperation,"	  in	  Brookings	  Doha	  Center	  Analysis	  Paper(Doha:	  Brookings	  Doha	  Center	  2010),	  11.	  6	  Lydia	  Polgreen,	  "World	  Bank	  Ends	  Effort	  to	  Help	  Chad	  Ease	  Poverty,"	  The	  
New	  York	  Times,	  10	  September	  2008.	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Another	  important	  reason	  that	  pipelines	  are	  built	  is	  energy	  security.	  The	  European	  Commission	  defines	  energy	  security	  as	  ‘uninterrupted	  physical	  availability	  on	  the	  market	  of	  energy	  products	  at	  a	  price	  which	  is	  available	  for	  all	  consumers’.7	  One	  of	  the	  key	  methods	  that	  states	  use	  to	  enhance	  their	  energy	  security	  is	  through	  the	  diversification	  of	  supply	  routes.	  As	  Winston	  Churchill	  told	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  in	  1913	  ‘on	  no	  one	  quality,	  on	  no	  one	  process,	  on	  no	  one	  country,	  on	  no	  one	  route	  and	  on	  no	  one	  field	  must	  we	  be	  dependent.	  Safety	  and	  security	  in	  oil	  lie	  in	  variety	  and	  variety	  alone’.8	  	  Hence	  pipelines	  can	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  another	  route	  in	  case	  of	  a	  disruption.	  The	  vulnerability	  of	  sea	  lines	  of	  communication	  and	  so-­‐called	  ‘maritime	  chokepoints’	  are	  one	  major	  driver	  of	  pipelines.	  These	  are	  narrow	  parts	  of	  shipping	  routes	  that	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  piracy,	  terrorism	  or	  closure	  in	  the	  case	  of	  political	  instability.	  There	  are	  seven	  major	  chokepoints	  that	  are	  vital	  to	  the	  international	  trade	  in	  oil	  and	  gas.	  These	  include	  the	  Strait	  of	  Hormuz,	  the	  Straits	  of	  Malacca,	  the	  Suez	  Canal,	  the	  Panama	  Canal,	  the	  Strait	  of	  Bab	  el-­‐Mandeb,	  the	  Turkish	  Straits	  and	  the	  Danish	  Straits.	  	  	  An	  example	  of	  a	  pipeline	  built	  to	  reduce	  the	  vulnerability	  created	  by	  a	  maritime	  chokepoint	  is	  the	  Sumed	  Pipeline,	  an	  alternate	  supply	  route	  to	  the	  Suez	  Canal.	  The	  pipeline	  runs	  from	  the	  Ain	  Sukhna	  terminal	  on	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Suez	  to	  Alexandria	  on	  the	  Mediterranean	  Sea.	  The	  pipeline	  was	  built	  in	  1973	  through	  the	  cooperation	  of	  five	  Arab	  governments	  after	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  was	  repeatedly	  closed	  throughout	  the	  1950s,	  60s,	  and	  70s	  due	  to	  war.	  	  	  	  1.1.3	  Interdependence	  	  	  Another	  less	  common	  driver	  for	  pipelines	  is	  integration	  or	  interdependence.	  This	  motivation	  rests	  upon	  the	  assumption	  that	  pipelines	  will	  improve	  the	  relationship	  due	  to	  economic	  interdependence.	  According	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  European	  Commission.	  "Secure,	  Clean	  and	  Efficient	  Energy,"	  European	  Union,	  2000.	  8	  Daniel	  Yergin,	  "Securing	  the	  Supply,"	  	  http://danielyergin.com/securing-­‐the-­‐supply/.	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to	  Scholar	  Saleem	  H.	  Ali	  ‘the	  fixed	  infrastructure	  of	  pipelines	  can	  foster	  economic	  cooperation	  between	  states	  and	  increase	  regional	  security’.9	  He	  uses	  examples	  such	  as	  the	  Baku-­‐Tbilisi-­‐Ceyhan	  pipeline	  to	  show	  how	  pipelines	  can	  not	  only	  generate	  revenue	  but	  also	  help	  to	  improve	  bilateral	  relations	  and	  even	  resolve	  conflicts.	  	  	  This	  is	  often	  cited	  as	  more	  of	  a	  flow	  on	  benefit	  for	  pipelines	  rather	  than	  their	  primary	  driving	  force.	  For	  example	  the	  Greenstream	  project	  was	  credited	  with	  significantly	  improving	  the	  relationship	  between	  Libya	  and	  Italy	  that	  had	  been	  damaged	  from	  the	  experience	  of	  Italian	  colonization.	  When	  Muammar	  Gaddaffi	  came	  to	  power	  in	  1969	  more	  than	  20,000	  Italians	  born	  in	  Libya	  were	  expelled.	  The	  opening	  ceremony	  of	  the	  pipeline	  in	  2004,	  held	  on	  the	  anniversary	  of	  Italian	  invasion,	  was	  directly	  linked	  to	  a	  gesture	  of	  reconciliation	  to	  grant	  Libyan-­‐born	  Italians	  the	  right	  to	  return	  to	  Libya.	  At	  the	  ceremony	  Gaddaffi	  said	  ‘we	  now	  want	  to	  make	  it	  a	  day	  of	  friendship	  and	  cooperation	  between	  Libya	  and	  Italy,	  a	  cooperation	  which	  has	  been	  cemented	  by	  the	  gas	  project	  which	  we	  are	  inaugurating	  today’.10	  	  But	  there	  are	  also	  some	  instances	  where	  interdependence	  is	  a	  primary	  driver.	  One	  is	  the	  planned	  TAPI	  line,	  which	  will	  transport	  gas	  from	  Turkmenistan	  across	  Afghanistan,	  Pakistan	  and	  India.	  The	  US	  has	  been	  behind	  a	  big	  push	  for	  the	  project	  in	  the	  hope	  it	  will	  enhance	  regional	  stability.	  	  According	  to	  one	  analyst	  ‘the	  pipeline	  and	  the	  cooperation	  needed	  to	  maintain	  it	  may	  be	  the	  best	  hope	  for	  regional	  stability’.11	  The	  pipeline,	  if	  completed	  is	  expected	  to	  create	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  in	  receipts	  for	  Afghanistan	  and	  create	  50,000	  jobs.	  But	  the	  spectre	  of	  disputes	  hangs	  over	  prospective	  pipeline	  projects	  and	  is	  a	  major	  barrier	  to	  securing	  financing	  and	  political	  support.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Ali,	  "Energizing	  Peace:	  The	  Role	  of	  Pipelines	  in	  Regional	  Cooperation,"	  5.	  10	  Ibid.,	  11.	  11	  Fred	  Starr,	  "The	  Pipeline	  That	  Could	  Keep	  the	  Peace	  in	  Afghanistan,"	  
Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  Oct	  21	  2013.	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1.2	  Disputes	  	  The	  benefits	  of	  energy	  pipelines	  come	  alongside	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  dispute	  and	  in	  the	  most	  serious	  cases	  disputes	  can	  result	  in	  cessation	  in	  supply.	  As	  one	  scholar	  has	  pointed	  out	  ‘while	  its	  true	  that	  many	  operating	  pipelines	  have	  avoided	  such	  problems,	  those	  that	  have	  such	  a	  history	  have	  casted	  a	  disproportionately	  long	  shadow’.12	  The	  consequences	  of	  disputes	  can	  be	  significant	  and	  the	  risk	  believed	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  projects	  deters	  investors	  and	  increases	  costs.	  Stoppages	  of	  supply	  can	  have	  disastrous	  economic,	  and	  even	  humanitarian	  impacts,	  and	  disputes	  can	  become	  a	  major	  point	  of	  tension	  in	  bilateral	  relations.	  Oil	  products	  are	  especially	  at	  risk	  because	  they	  operate	  by	  ‘tight’	  supply	  meaning	  that	  even	  a	  minor	  disruption	  or	  threat	  thereof	  can	  immediately	  effect	  global	  prices	  and	  cause	  significant	  ripple	  effects.	  	  While	  stoppages	  to	  gas	  don’t	  have	  the	  same	  effect	  on	  international	  markets,	  gas	  lines	  are	  much	  more	  difficult	  expensive	  to	  reconnect	  once	  they	  have	  been	  stopped	  and	  the	  difficulty	  of	  converting	  gas	  to	  LNG	  means	  that	  supplies	  cannot	  easily	  be	  diverted	  elsewhere.	  	  	  	  A	  2014	  study	  55	  high-­‐profile	  transnational	  pipelines,	  both	  in	  development	  and	  operation,	  found	  that	  political	  risk	  was	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  consequential	  source	  of	  risk	  followed	  by	  commercial,	  security	  and	  environmental.	  Political	  risk	  affected	  28%	  of	  the	  operational	  pipelines	  studied	  resulting	  in	  a	  cessation	  of	  supply	  in	  nine	  cases.13	  Disputes	  are	  often	  over	  issues	  such	  as	  pricing,	  transit	  terms	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  gas	  or	  oil	  countries	  are	  entitled	  to	  take	  from	  the	  line.	  	  	  The	  most	  high	  profile	  example	  of	  a	  dispute	  is	  that	  of	  the	  Russia-­‐Ukraine	  disputes	  over	  the	  Russia-­‐Europe	  lines,	  which	  led	  to	  a	  two-­‐week	  cessation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Paul	  Stevens,	  "Transit	  Troubles:	  Pipelines	  as	  a	  Source	  of	  Conflict	  "	  in	  
Chatham	  House	  Report(London:	  Royal	  Institute	  of	  International	  Affairs,	  2009),	  17.	  13	  Thomas	  J.	  Dimitroff,	  "Cross-­‐Border	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Pipeline	  Risk	  and	  Sustainable	  Mitigations,"	  The	  Journal	  of	  World	  Energy	  Law	  &	  Business	  7,	  no.	  4	  (2014):	  318.	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of	  supply	  in	  the	  winter	  of	  2009.	  Russia	  at	  that	  time	  provided	  Europe	  with	  approximately	  25%	  of	  its	  gas	  and	  80%	  of	  this	  went	  through	  pipelines	  located	  in	  Ukrainian	  territory.14	  	  It	  was	  not	  the	  first	  time	  the	  disputes	  had	  caused	  a	  stoppage	  but	  it	  was	  the	  most	  serious	  and	  long	  lasting.	  For	  many	  European	  countries,	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  an	  unusually	  cold	  winter,	  the	  incident	  was	  a	  major	  humanitarian	  and	  economic	  catastrophe.	  Slovakia	  for	  example,	  which	  imports	  99%	  of	  its	  gas	  from	  Russia,	  declared	  a	  state-­‐of-­‐emergency.15	  	  The	  cessation	  of	  supply	  began	  when	  previous	  transit	  agreements	  expired	  on	  December	  31st.	  The	  two	  sides	  had	  failed	  to	  agree	  on	  a	  price	  for	  Russian	  gas	  supplied	  to	  Ukraine	  (which	  had	  historically	  been	  at	  rates	  far	  below	  that	  charged	  to	  Europe)	  and	  on	  the	  tariff	  given	  to	  Ukraine	  for	  the	  gas	  supplied	  to	  Europe.	  	  While	  the	  dispute	  was	  ostensibly	  about	  pricing,	  the	  root	  cause	  was	  strained	  relations	  between	  Russia	  and	  Ukraine.16	  After	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  former	  Soviet	  CIS	  states	  were	  given	  a	  much	  lower	  gas	  price	  than	  Europe	  but	  Russian	  gas	  giant	  Gazprom	  had	  been	  pushing	  to	  close	  the	  gap.	  	  Belarus	  and	  Armenia,	  which	  were	  much	  closer	  to	  Russia	  politically,	  were	  able	  to	  negotiate	  much	  longer	  timetables	  for	  import	  price	  increases	  whilst	  those	  who	  countries	  who	  had	  distanced	  themselves,	  Georgia	  and	  Ukraine,	  were	  being	  forced	  to	  repay	  debt	  and	  pay	  market	  rates.	  	  It	  has	  been	  this	  event	  more	  than	  any	  other	  that	  has	  brought	  attention	  to	  transnational	  pipelines	  and	  the	  problems	  that	  they	  face.	  	  As	  it	  is	  established	  that	  pipelines	  are	  an	  increasingly	  important	  feature	  of	  international	  relations	  and	  that	  they	  are	  susceptible	  to	  disputes,	  the	  question	  that	  this	  paper	  therefore	  seeks	  to	  address	  is:	  why	  are	  oil	  and	  gas	  pipelines	  susceptible	  to	  disputes?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Jon	  Henley,	  "Is	  Europe's	  Gas	  Supply	  Threatened	  by	  the	  Ukraine	  Crisis?,"	  
The	  Guardian,	  3	  March	  2014.	  15	  Jonathon	  Stern	  and	  Katja	  Yafimava	  Simon	  Pirani,	  "The	  Russo-­‐Ukraine	  Gas	  Dispute	  of	  2009:	  A	  Comprehensive	  Assessment,"(Oxford	  Institute	  for	  Energy	  Studies,	  2009),	  53.	  16	  Ibid.	  
9	  
	  
2.	  Literature	  	  
	  Making	  sense	  of	  why	  disputes	  emerge	  is	  a	  question	  that	  deserves	  more	  attention	  from	  International	  Relations	  scholarship.	  The	  connection	  (or	  perceived	  thereof)	  between	  pipelines	  and	  national	  interest	  and	  the	  impact	  that	  pipelines	  can	  have	  on	  international	  relations	  calls	  for	  more	  insight.	  Brenda	  Shaffer	  raises	  the	  point	  that	  in	  the	  thirty-­‐year	  history	  of	  leading	  international	  relations	  journal	  International	  Security	  prior	  to	  2009,	  only	  eight	  articles	  had	  been	  published	  about	  energy.17	  While	  foreign	  affairs	  type	  publications	  often	  run	  policy	  type	  commentary	  which	  makes	  certain	  assumptions	  about	  the	  international	  system	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  states,	  theory	  is	  not	  often	  used	  to	  examine	  energy	  and	  pipelines.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  literature	  on	  pipelines	  and	  identify	  the	  theoretical	  assumptions.	  It	  will	  also	  identify	  the	  gap	  in	  the	  literature,	  to	  explain	  how	  meanings	  associated	  with	  pipelines	  are	  socially	  constructed.	  It	  is	  organised	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  theory.	  
	  The	  main	  theories	  of	  international	  relations	  take	  the	  international	  system	  to	  be	  anarchical.	  Transnational	  pipelines,	  because	  they	  cross	  the	  boundaries	  of	  states,	  operate	  under	  this	  condition	  of	  anarchy.	  The	  international	  system	  consists	  of	  sovereign	  states	  and	  there	  is	  no	  over-­‐arching	  jurisdiction	  or	  government	  to	  enforce	  contracts,	  provide	  an	  objective	  basis	  for	  assessing	  transit	  terms	  or	  to	  adjudicate	  disputes.	  Realist	  theories	  take	  the	  view	  that	  this	  anarchy	  means	  inevitable	  power	  struggles	  and	  conflict,	  liberals’	  stress	  that	  states	  can	  co-­‐operate	  in	  such	  an	  environment	  for	  mutual	  gains	  and	  constructivists	  believe	  that	  ‘anarchy	  is	  what	  you	  make	  of	  it’.	  With	  these	  assumptions	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Roland	  Dannreuther,	  "International	  Relations	  Theories:	  Energy,	  Minerals	  and	  Conflict,"	  in	  EU	  Policy	  on	  Natural	  Resources(2010),	  1.	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these	  respective	  schools	  have	  provided	  explanations	  for	  why	  disputes	  occur	  over	  pipelines.	  	  	  
2.1	  Realism	  	  A	  common	  explanation	  for	  why	  pipelines	  are	  susceptible	  to	  disputes	  is	  geopolitics.	  Based	  largely	  on	  realist	  theories	  of	  international	  relations,	  geopolitical	  explanations	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  material	  forms	  of	  power,	  proximity	  and	  the	  competitive	  nature	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  	  An	  analysis	  of	  disputes	  from	  a	  realist	  perspective	  focuses	  on	  a	  state’s	  use	  of	  energy	  to	  support	  larger	  foreign	  policy	  objectives,	  the	  consequences	  of	  shifts	  in	  the	  relative	  distribution	  of	  power	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  	  ‘zero-­‐sum	  competition’	  over	  scarce	  resources.	  	  	  	  Realism	  has	  two	  main	  variants.	  Classical	  realism,	  with	  roots	  in	  the	  
realpolitik	  ideas	  of	  thinkers	  like	  Machiavelli,	  focuses	  on	  the	  natural	  human	  tendency	  toward	  aggression.	  Neo	  or	  structural-­‐realism	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  focuses	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  international	  system	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  power.	  Both	  assume	  that	  international	  relations	  are	  a	  ‘zero-­‐sum	  game’	  and	  that	  states	  are	  self-­‐interested,	  rational	  and	  unitary	  actors.	  	  Some	  key	  assumptions	  of	  realism	  when	  applied	  to	  energy	  include	  that;	  energy	  is	  a	  key	  ingredient	  of	  state	  power	  and	  central	  to	  national	  interest,	  energy	  resources	  are	  becoming	  scarcer	  and	  more	  insecure,	  states	  are	  forced	  to	  compete	  over	  energy	  resources	  in	  an	  anarchical	  environment,	  and	  that	  conflicts	  over	  resources	  are	  increasingly	  likely	  if	  not	  inevitable.18	  	  Pipeline	  disputes	  are	  often	  explained	  with	  these	  assumptions.	  Daniel	  Freifeld	  says	  of	  the	  European-­‐Russian	  disputes	  that	  ‘today’s	  gas	  war	  is	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  conflict	  similar	  to	  the	  scramble	  for	  resources	  that	  divided	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Ibid.,	  10.	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Eurasia	  in	  the	  19th	  century’.19	  	  The	  notion	  of	  conflict	  being	  zero-­‐sum	  is	  central	  to	  realist	  theory	  and	  an	  important	  difference	  from	  other	  theories.	  This	  suggests	  that	  states	  seek	  relative	  and	  not	  mutual	  or	  absolute	  gains	  from	  cooperation	  in	  pipelines	  and	  this	  is	  a	  source	  of	  conflict.	  This	  idea	  that	  energy	  is	  part	  of	  a	  ‘great	  game’	  of	  geopolitical	  competition	  is	  a	  common	  feature	  of	  realist	  analysis.	  Realist	  analysis	  on	  pipelines	  and	  international	  relations	  often	  examines	  connections	  between	  energy	  and	  security	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  Lusine	  Badalyan	  argues	  that	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  BTC	  and	  BTE	  pipelines	  altered	  the	  distribution	  of	  power	  in	  the	  South	  Caucasus	  because	  they	  ended	  Russia’s	  monopolistic	  control	  over	  energy	  routes	  from	  the	  Caspian	  region.20	  	  She	  explains	  that	  this	  gave	  countries	  such	  as	  Azerbaijan	  and	  Georgia	  the	  ability	  to	  move	  out	  of	  the	  Russian	  sphere	  of	  influence	  and	  forge	  their	  own	  security	  orientation.	  Implicit	  in	  these	  explanations	  are	  realist	  notions	  such	  as	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  and	  regional	  strategic	  spheres	  of	  influence.	  	  	  Realists	  of	  the	  realpolitik	  classical	  variety	  would	  also	  emphasise	  that	  states	  are	  likely	  to	  deploy	  energy	  assets	  in	  support	  of	  broader	  foreign	  policy	  objectives.	  This	  notion	  of	  using	  energy	  as	  a	  weapon	  to	  secure	  relative	  gains	  in	  a	  competitive	  international	  environment	  is	  a	  common	  thread	  throughout	  analysis	  of	  the	  Russia-­‐Eastern	  European	  gas	  disputes.	  	  According	  to	  Robert	  Kaplan	  and	  Eugene	  Chausovsky,	  Russia	  uses	  energy	  to	  influence	  the	  decision	  making	  of	  Belarus,	  Bulgaria	  and	  the	  Baltic	  states	  giving	  ‘beneficial	  terms	  to	  states	  that	  cooperate	  with	  Moscow,	  while	  charging	  higher	  prices	  and	  occasionally	  cutting	  off	  supplies	  altogether	  to	  those	  that	  don’t.’21	  	  2.1.1	  Strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  realist	  approach	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Daniel	  Freifield,	  "The	  Great	  Pipeline	  Opera,"	  Foreign	  Policy,	  August	  24,	  2009	  2009.	  20	  Lusine	  Badalyan,	  "The	  Geopolitics	  of	  Pipeline	  Diplomacy,"	  10	  October	  2012.	  21	  Robert	  Kaplan	  and	  Eugene	  Chausovsky,	  "Pipelines	  of	  Empire,"	  Forbes,	  November	  11	  2013.	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  One	  of	  the	  strengths	  of	  realism	  is	  that	  it	  has	  considerable	  explanatory	  power	  with	  simple	  ideas.	  It	  makes	  a	  straightforward,	  though	  contestable,	  set	  of	  claims	  about	  the	  international	  system	  that	  can	  help	  to	  explain	  trends	  in	  state	  behavior.	  Ideas	  like	  anarchy,	  power	  seeking	  and	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  can	  give	  insights,	  in	  a	  broad	  sense,	  into	  why	  pipelines	  may	  lead	  to	  disputes.	  This	  is	  the	  biggest	  strength	  of	  realism	  but	  also	  the	  biggest	  weakness.	  The	  fact	  that	  it	  can	  only	  demarcate	  large	  trends	  in	  international	  relations	  makes	  it	  less	  useful	  for	  making	  sense	  of	  specific	  relationships	  or	  events	  because	  it	  pays	  no	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  history,	  beliefs,	  domestic	  politics	  or	  other	  aspects	  of	  state	  identity.	  	  	  Additionally,	  many	  of	  the	  central	  claims	  of	  realism	  are	  problematic	  and	  this	  is	  especially	  true	  with	  this	  subject	  matter.	  For	  example	  realism’s	  sole	  focus	  on	  the	  state	  as	  the	  only	  relevant	  actor	  in	  international	  affairs	  overlooks	  a	  range	  of	  other	  important	  players	  in	  the	  energy	  sphere.	  According	  to	  founder	  of	  structural	  realism	  Kenneth	  Waltz;	  ‘states	  are	  the	  units	  whose	  actions	  form	  the	  structure	  of	  international	  relations.	  They	  will	  long	  remain	  so’.22	  This	  overlooks	  the	  role	  of	  important	  sub-­‐national	  and	  transnational	  groups	  from	  civil	  society	  to	  international	  energy	  companies	  who	  are	  increasingly	  important	  players	  contributing	  to	  pipeline	  outcomes.	  	  	  Similarly,	  the	  notion	  that	  states	  are	  ‘unitary’	  actors	  in	  foreign	  affairs	  can	  be	  called	  into	  question	  when	  analyzing	  the	  behavior	  of	  national	  oil	  companies	  who	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  have,	  worked	  against	  the	  objectives	  of	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  foreign	  policy	  apparatus.	  A	  recent	  study	  by	  the	  IEA	  found	  that	  China’s	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  were	  becoming	  increasingly	  autonomous	  from	  the	  central	  government	  in	  their	  activities	  abroad,	  dispelling	  the	  notion	  that	  they	  were	  following	  common	  overarching	  objectives.	  This	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Kenneth	  Waltz,	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics(Reading,	  Massachusetts:	  Addison	  Wesley	  Publishing	  Company,	  1979),	  54.	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despite	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  entities	  are	  wholly	  state	  owned	  and	  senior	  managers	  are	  high-­‐ranking	  party	  officials.	  23	  	  	  The	  most	  significant	  shortcoming	  of	  realism	  for	  analyzing	  this	  subject	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  all	  states	  will	  behave	  in	  similar	  ways	  and	  share	  common	  or	  natural	  material	  interests.	  	  This	  position	  is	  articulated	  by	  Kenneth	  Waltz	  when	  he	  talks	  about	  states	  as	  ‘units’	  and	  says	  ‘states	  are	  alike	  in	  the	  tasks	  they	  face,	  though	  not	  in	  their	  abilities	  to	  perform	  them.	  The	  differences	  are	  of	  capability,	  not	  of	  function….	  international	  politics	  consists	  of	  like	  units	  duplicating	  one	  another’s	  activities’.24	  He	  explains	  that	  ‘state	  behavior	  varies	  more	  with	  differences	  in	  power	  than	  with	  difference	  in	  ideology,	  in	  internal	  structure	  of	  property	  relations	  or	  in	  governmental	  form.’25	  This	  position	  assumes	  that	  given	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  circumstances,	  all	  states	  would	  behave	  in	  the	  same	  ways	  regardless	  of	  ideology,	  domestic	  politics,	  leadership,	  and	  institutional	  constraints.	  This	  is	  a	  problematic	  claim	  and	  a	  frequent	  criticism	  of	  realist	  theory.	  As	  this	  analysis	  will	  show,	  states’	  interests	  with	  respect	  to	  energy	  are	  influenced	  by	  domestic	  social	  forces	  and	  the	  agents	  that	  produce	  and	  reproduce	  them.	  	  An	  example	  is	  the	  Eilat-­‐Ashkelon	  Pipeline	  that	  was	  built	  through	  a	  joint	  Israeli-­‐Iranian	  venture	  in	  1968	  to	  transport	  crude	  from	  Iran	  to	  Europe	  through	  Israel.	  The	  Iranians	  cut	  all	  diplomatic	  ties	  with	  Israel	  and	  stopped	  the	  use	  of	  the	  pipeline	  after	  Shah	  Mohammad	  Reza	  Pahlavi	  was	  overthrown	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution	  in	  1979.	  There	  were	  still	  some	  800,000	  tonnes	  of	  crude	  in	  the	  pipeline	  at	  the	  time,	  worth	  about	  $400m	  in	  today’s	  prices,	  and	  there	  have	  been	  ongoing	  legal	  disputes	  taking	  place	  over	  the	  last	  three	  decades.26	  	  This	  example	  problematizes	  the	  realist	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Julie	  Jiang	  and	  Jonathan	  Sinton,	  "Overseas	  Investments	  by	  Chinese	  National	  Oil	  Companies	  "(International	  Energy	  Agency,	  2011).	  24	  Waltz,	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics,	  96.	  25	  Reflections	  on	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics.	  A	  Response	  to	  My	  Critics,	  Neorealism	  and	  Its	  Critics	  (1986),	  202-­‐03.	  26	  Aluf	  Benn,	  "The	  Secret	  Hands	  Guiding	  Israel's	  Controversial	  Pipeline,"	  
Hareetz	  2015.	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notion	  that	  interests	  are	  fixed	  and	  material	  and	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  understanding	  the	  role	  of	  identity	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  interests.	  	  	  	  While	  realism	  is	  able	  to	  make	  some	  general	  claims	  about	  the	  international	  system	  that	  might	  be	  useful	  in	  understanding	  why	  transnational	  pipelines	  are	  susceptible	  to	  disputes	  such	  as	  the	  effects	  of	  anarchy	  and	  the	  self-­‐interested	  nature	  of	  states,	  it	  is	  so	  general	  as	  to	  be	  useless	  in	  making	  sense	  of	  a	  particular	  circumstances	  that	  are	  intertwined	  with	  history,	  identity,	  domestic	  politics	  and	  other	  ideational	  factors.	  	  
	  
2.2	  Neoliberalism	  	  	  	  Unlike	  realists,	  liberals	  see	  in	  anarchy	  opportunities	  for	  cooperation	  for	  mutual	  gain.	  Their	  ideas	  are	  grounded	  in	  a	  more	  positive	  view	  of	  human	  nature	  and	  they	  are	  more	  optimistic	  about	  the	  prospects	  for	  progress	  and	  cooperation	  through	  means	  such	  as	  international	  law	  and	  international	  institutions.	  When	  liberals	  account	  for	  the	  incidence	  of	  disputes	  relating	  to	  oil	  and	  gas	  pipelines,	  they	  point	  to	  the	  underdeveloped	  legal	  and	  institutional	  framework	  for	  energy	  transit.	  This	  section	  will	  examine	  the	  liberal	  argument	  that	  weak	  institutions	  are	  the	  source	  of	  disputes	  and	  consider	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Energy	  Charter	  and	  international	  law.	  	  	  According	  to	  Robert	  Keohane	  and	  Lisa	  Martin	  ‘institutions	  can	  provide	  information,	  reduce	  transaction	  costs,	  make	  commitments	  more	  credible,	  establish	  focal	  points	  for	  coordination,	  and	  in	  general	  facilitate	  the	  operation	  of	  reciprocity’.27	  This	  is	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  realist	  position	  articulated	  by	  neorealist	  John	  Mearsheimer	  when	  he	  says	  ‘institutions	  have	  no	  independent	  effect	  on	  state	  behavior’.28	  But	  while	  institutional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Robert	  O.	  Keohane	  and	  Lisa	  L.	  Martin,	  "The	  Promise	  of	  Institutionalist	  Theory,"	  International	  Security	  20,	  no.	  1	  (1995):	  42.	  28	  Ibid.	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frameworks	  deal	  with	  many	  aspects	  of	  international	  relations,	  developments	  have	  been	  slow	  with	  regard	  to	  energy	  transit.	  As	  one	  legal	  scholar	  put	  it	  ‘the	  ability	  of	  oil	  and	  gas	  producing	  states	  and	  companies	  to	  transport	  energy	  products	  unimpeded	  and	  without	  risk	  of	  stoppage	  and	  siphoning	  via	  transit	  states	  is	  perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  legal	  issues	  for	  the	  energy	  industry	  in	  the	  21st	  century’.29	  The	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  different	  states	  involved	  in	  a	  transnational	  pipeline	  are	  typically	  laid	  out	  in	  an	  agreement,	  which	  has	  the	  force	  of	  a	  treaty	  in	  international	  law,	  but	  unlike	  domestic	  law,	  international	  law	  encounters	  challenges	  in	  interpretation	  and	  enforcement.	  As	  a	  result	  governments	  tend	  to	  ignore	  pipeline	  agreements	  when	  disputes	  emerge.30	  	  	  Liberal	  scholars	  therefore	  advocate	  the	  strengthening	  of	  international	  institutions	  to	  deal	  with	  disputes.	  Looking	  to	  regional	  organisations,	  Natasha	  Chichilnisky-­‐Heal	  argues	  that	  the	  unique	  institutional	  structure	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  Cooperation	  Organisation	  ‘makes	  it	  an	  ideal	  starting	  point	  for	  a	  new	  institutional	  approach	  to	  conflict	  mitigation	  in	  the	  Eurasian	  energy	  sector.	  She	  describes	  the	  2009	  Ukraine-­‐Russia	  disputes	  as	  ‘a	  high	  profile	  example	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  institutional	  mechanisms	  for	  coping	  with	  transnational	  pipeline	  conflict’	  and	  points	  out	  that	  the	  Energy	  Charter	  Treaty	  has	  ‘weak	  incentives	  for	  compliance’.31	  Liberals	  see	  institutions	  as	  mechanisms	  for	  cooperation	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  pipelines	  they	  argue	  that	  they	  can	  set	  rules	  and	  fulfill	  roles	  such	  as	  arbitration	  when	  disputes	  occur.	  	  	  Liberal	  scholars	  also	  use	  the	  example	  of	  the	  EU	  to	  support	  their	  arguments.	  Amongst	  the	  EU	  countries	  of	  Western	  Europe	  there	  have	  been	  virtually	  no	  major	  problems	  or	  disputes	  despite	  the	  region	  being	  host	  to	  many	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Dr	  Yang	  Zewei,	  "The	  Energy	  Charter	  Treaty	  and	  Dispute	  Settlement	  of	  Transnational	  Energy	  Pipelines:	  A	  Chinese	  Perspective,"	  China	  Energy	  Law	  
and	  Policy,	  no.	  China	  National	  Social	  Science	  Fund	  Great	  Project	  2009	  (2011):	  397.	  30	  Stevens,	  "Transit	  Troubles:	  Pipelines	  as	  a	  Source	  of	  Conflict	  "	  2.	  31	  Natasha	  Chichilnisky-­‐Heal,	  "How	  to	  Solve	  the	  Pipeline	  Problem,"	  (2009),	  https://www.academia.edu/6502062/How_to_Solve_the_Pipeline_Problem_-­‐_from_2009.	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world’s	  cross-­‐border	  pipelines.	  Paul	  Stevens	  attributes	  this	  to	  the	  common	  jurisdiction	  created	  by	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome	  in	  1957.32	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  Middle	  East	  where	  all	  nine	  of	  the	  major	  pipelines	  have	  experienced	  disruptions.	  The	  difference	  in	  the	  language	  of	  international	  relations	  is	  that	  Europe	  does	  not	  have	  a	  state	  of	  anarchy	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  Middle	  East	  does,	  overarching	  regulations	  and	  legal	  jurisdictions	  prevent	  disputes	  from	  occurring.	  	  	  The	  Energy	  Charter	  is	  attempting	  to	  fill	  this	  legal	  and	  institutional	  vacuum	  but	  faces	  a	  number	  of	  shortcomings.	  The	  Charter	  is	  a	  multilateral	  process	  first	  agreed	  to	  in	  1991	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  facilitating	  transit	  and	  integrating	  energy	  sectors	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Europe	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  The	  core	  aim	  is	  to	  strengthen	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  on	  energy	  issues	  and	  thereby	  mitigate	  the	  risk	  associated	  with	  energy-­‐related	  investment	  and	  trade.33	  The	  Charter	  itself	  is	  not	  legally	  binding	  but	  rather	  a	  declaration	  of	  political	  intention.	  	  The	  legal	  instrument	  of	  the	  Charter	  is	  the	  
Energy	  Charter	  Treaty	  signed	  in	  1994,	  which	  has	  been	  signed	  or	  acceded	  to	  by	  52	  states,	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  Euratom.	  It	  covers	  four	  main	  areas:	  protection	  of	  foreign	  investments,	  non-­‐discriminatory	  conditions	  for	  trade,	  the	  resolution	  of	  disputes	  (state-­‐state/investor-­‐state)	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  energy	  efficiency.	  	  	  At	  a	  meeting	  in	  Turkmenistan	  in	  2009	  Energy	  Charter	  Secretariat	  Secretary	  General	  Andre	  Mernier	  explained	  the	  task	  of	  the	  ECT;	  	   ‘[The]	  growing	  importance	  [of	  energy	  transit]	  is	  based	  upon	  increasing	  energy	  interdependence	  in	  the	  context	  of	  rising	  pressure	  on	  world	  energy	  supplies.	  Given	  the	  global	  distribution	  of	  energy	  resources,	  current	  technologies	  and	  projections	  of	  demand,	  the	  priority	  for	  policy	  makers	  should	  be	  on	  how	  to	  manage	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Stevens,	  "Transit	  Troubles:	  Pipelines	  as	  a	  Source	  of	  Conflict	  "	  13.	  33	  Energy	  Charter	  Secretariat,	  "About	  the	  Energy	  Charter,"	  	  http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=7.	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interdependence	  and	  supply	  most	  effectively;	  on	  creating	  functioning	  and	  balanced	  international	  frameworks	  that	  can	  mitigate	  associated	  risks’.	  34	  	  The	  Energy	  Charter	  seeks	  to	  build	  a	  regime	  of	  commonly	  accepted	  principles	  covering	  transit	  flows	  such	  as	  the	  freedom	  of	  transit	  (without	  unreasonable	  delays	  or	  charges)	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  (on	  the	  basis	  of	  origin,	  destination	  or	  ownership).	  The	  Charter	  also	  includes	  a	  mechanism	  for	  transit	  disputes	  but	  this	  failed	  to	  resolve	  the	  2006	  and	  2009	  energy	  crises	  between	  Russia	  and	  CIS	  states	  which	  were	  instead	  solved	  bilaterally	  behind	  closed	  doors.	  According	  to	  Dr	  Katja	  Yafimava	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  on	  the	  part	  of	  ECT	  parties	  to	  use	  the	  ECT	  in	  the	  context	  of	  transit	  and	  this	  is	  calling	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  Charter	  into	  question	  with	  respect	  to	  transit.35	  Other	  commentators	  are	  more	  upbeat	  about	  the	  Charter’s	  future	  and	  ability	  to	  deal	  with	  transit	  disputes.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  legal	  challenges	  that	  face	  pipelines	  is	  an	  international	  standard	  for	  assessing	  transit	  fees,	  which	  is	  a	  key	  source	  of	  disagreement	  for	  states.	  According	  to	  Saleem	  H.	  Ali,	  the	  Energy	  Charter	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  create	  clear	  guidelines	  for	  fair	  transit	  fees,	  which	  can	  help	  in	  framing	  and	  facilitating	  future	  negotiations.36	  	  Thomas	  Dimitroff	  explores	  other	  relevant	  international	  public	  law	  relevant	  to	  transnational	  pipelines	  and	  argues	  that	  its	  inadequacy	  holds	  back	  the	  development	  of	  more	  pipelines.37	  Many	  of	  the	  multilateral	  legal	  instruments	  that	  apply	  to	  the	  international	  trade	  in	  crude	  oil	  and	  gas	  are	  more	  applicable	  to	  maritime	  shipping	  and	  by	  rail	  or	  truck	  rather	  than	  through	  pipelines.	  Examples	  of	  such	  principles	  in	  international	  law	  include	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Ali,	  "Energizing	  Peace:	  The	  Role	  of	  Pipelines	  in	  Regional	  Cooperation,"	  22.	  35	  Dr	  Katja	  Yafimava,	  "Why	  Did	  the	  Energy	  Charter	  Treaty	  Fail	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  Transit	  "	  (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Energy	  Charter	  Treaty	  Conference,	  Stockholm,	  9-­‐10	  June	  2011).	  36	  Ali,	  "Energizing	  Peace:	  The	  Role	  of	  Pipelines	  in	  Regional	  Cooperation,"	  22.	  37	  Dimitroff,	  "Cross-­‐Border	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Pipeline	  Risk	  and	  Sustainable	  Mitigations,"	  300.	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rights	  of	  ‘transit	  passage’	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  transit	  for	  goods	  in	  transit	  in	  Article	  V	  of	  the	  General	  Agreement	  on	  Tariffs	  and	  Trade	  (GATT).	  	  Dimitroff	  explains	  that	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  landlocked	  countries	  that	  his	  study	  examined,	  five	  out	  of	  seven	  of	  which	  have	  faced	  major	  supply	  disruptions,	  ‘existing	  multilateral	  treaties	  and	  principles	  of	  law	  are	  simply	  not	  equipped	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  important	  kind	  of	  risk’.38	  	  2.2.1	  Strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  liberal	  approach	  
	  By	  focusing	  on	  the	  role	  of	  international	  institutions	  liberal	  scholars	  provide	  an	  alternate,	  but	  not	  incompatible,	  perspective	  to	  realism	  about	  the	  causes	  for	  disputes	  over	  transnational	  pipelines.	  Liberalism	  pays	  attention	  to	  different	  features	  of	  international	  relations	  such	  as	  the	  role	  of	  economics,	  institutions	  and	  international	  law.	  The	  liberal	  argument	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  an	  institutional	  framework	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  disputes	  is	  useful	  but	  this	  is	  only	  a	  permissive	  cause	  similar	  to	  the	  realist	  argument	  that	  ‘wars	  happen	  because	  there	  is	  nothing	  to	  prevent	  them’.	  	  	  But	  this	  claim	  rests	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  institutions	  are	  actually	  able	  to	  prevent	  disputes.	  The	  realist	  critique	  of	  liberal	  institutionalism	  is	  to	  question	  how	  much	  difference	  institutions	  and	  international	  law	  make	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  issues	  that	  are	  perceived	  as	  being	  in	  the	  national	  interest.	  	  As	  Shirley	  Scott	  points	  out	  ‘the	  international	  law	  of	  telecommunications	  or	  airline	  travel	  may	  well	  be	  regularly	  complied	  with	  but	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  questions	  of	  ‘high	  politics’	  such	  as	  the	  decision	  to	  use	  force,	  international	  law	  plays	  a	  minor	  role	  if	  any	  in	  national	  decision	  making’.39	  	  Even	  though	  the	  Energy	  Charter	  has	  dispute	  resolution	  mechanisms,	  countries	  have	  opted	  to	  ignore	  it	  and	  instead	  deal	  with	  disputes	  behind	  closed	  doors.	  The	  Energy	  Charter	  received	  a	  major	  setback	  in	  2009	  when	  Russia	  decided	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Ibid.	  39	  Anthony	  Burke	  and	  Jim	  George	  Richard	  Devetak,	  ed.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  
International	  Relations:	  Australian	  Perspectives,	  International	  Law	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008).	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withdraw	  from	  it	  altogether.	  What	  this	  illustrates	  is	  that	  the	  ECT,	  like	  many	  international	  institutions,	  can	  be	  criticized	  for	  being	  ‘toothless’.	  	  	  	  From	  a	  more	  constructivist	  perspective,	  another	  criticism	  of	  liberalism	  is	  that	  institutions	  can	  also	  entrench	  and	  perpetuate	  structures	  of	  power	  in	  the	  international	  system	  that	  favor	  some	  states	  over	  others.	  From	  this	  perspective	  they	  are	  not	  ‘neutral	  entities’	  but	  rather	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  certain	  values	  and	  certain	  modes	  of	  interaction.	  According	  to	  Andrei	  Belyi	  ‘Russia	  views	  the	  Energy	  Charter	  as	  the	  main	  tool	  in	  the	  EU’s	  energy	  policy,	  mainly	  because	  the	  EU	  has	  given	  the	  impression	  that	  Russia	  should	  accept	  the	  Treaty	  as	  it	  is’.40	  	  It	  is	  perhaps	  for	  this	  reason	  many	  states	  have	  refused	  to	  join	  the	  ECT,	  with	  China	  notably	  only	  at	  observer	  status.	  Focusing	  on	  the	  ideas	  and	  identities	  that	  constitute	  institutions	  gives	  different	  insights	  into	  the	  why	  and	  how	  they	  were	  formed	  and	  how	  they	  ensure	  compliance.	  A	  constructivist	  might	  as	  for	  example:	  what	  impact	  did	  Gorbachev’s	  desire	  for	  Russia	  to	  be	  an	  ‘acceptable’	  member	  of	  the	  international	  community	  have	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Energy	  Charter?	  These	  perspectives	  would	  offer	  different	  insights	  into	  the	  success	  or	  otherwise	  of	  institutions	  like	  the	  ECT	  	  Finally	  liberalism	  shares	  many	  assumptions	  with	  realism	  about	  states	  and	  the	  international	  system.	  Like	  realism,	  liberals	  assume	  that	  states	  are	  unitary,	  rational	  actors	  and	  in	  a	  given	  set	  of	  circumstances	  (such	  as	  the	  creation	  of	  institutions)	  they	  will	  behave	  in	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  ways.	  Liberals	  assume	  that	  states	  will	  pursue	  a	  rational	  calculated	  set	  of	  policies	  based	  on	  interests	  that	  are	  natural	  to	  them	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  states.	  This	  claim	  is	  what	  constructivist	  scholars	  take	  to	  be	  problematic.	  States	  are	  not	  only	  guided	  by	  ‘the	  logic	  of	  consequences’	  but	  also	  by	  the	  ‘logic	  of	  appropriateness’	  and	  there	  is	  a	  connection	  between	  ‘who	  we	  are’	  and	  ‘what	  we	  want’.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Andrei	  Belyi,	  "Russia's	  Position	  on	  the	  Energy	  Charter,"	  in	  Russia	  and	  
Eurasia	  Programme(Chatham	  House,	  2012),	  p.2.	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2.3	  Toward	  a	  social	  theory	  	  Paul	  Stevens	  considers	  the	  explanation	  for	  pipeline	  disputes	  to	  be	  in	  the	  different	  competing	  interests	  of	  the	  parties	  involved.	  He	  says	  that	  ‘where	  relationships	  are	  governed	  purely	  by	  commercial	  considerations,	  differences	  are	  relatively	  easily	  resolved’	  and	  ‘frequently,	  projects	  that	  are	  driven	  by	  politics	  rather	  than	  commercial	  considerations	  end	  in	  failure’.41	  An	  example	  he	  gives	  is	  the	  impact	  of	  Syria’s	  ‘socialist’	  development	  strategy,	  which	  reduced	  its	  interest	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  and	  therefore	  reduced	  a	  major	  barrier	  to	  acting	  unilaterally	  to	  renegotiate	  terms.42	  This	  points	  to	  the	  domestic,	  rather	  than	  the	  international	  structure	  as	  a	  reason	  why	  pipelines	  are	  susceptible	  to	  disputes.	  	  	  But	  where	  do	  these	  interests	  come	  from?	  In	  trying	  to	  explain	  why	  pipeline	  projects	  are	  completed,	  Benjamin	  Sovacool	  looks	  at	  how	  different	  parties	  interpret	  the	  project	  and	  how	  this	  can	  influence	  the	  outcome.	  	  Using	  concepts	  from	  the	  sociology-­‐based	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Studies	  Sovacool	  (2010)	  researched	  the	  ‘interpretive	  flexibility’	  of	  transnational	  pipelines.43	  His	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  why	  the	  Baku-­‐Tbilisi-­‐Ceyhan	  (BTC)	  pipeline	  was	  built	  and	  why	  the	  Trans-­‐ASEAN	  gas	  pipeline	  was	  not	  concluded	  that	  pipelines	  have	  different	  meanings	  to	  different	  parties	  involved	  (or	  ‘relevant	  social	  groups’	  as	  he	  terms	  it)	  and	  this	  is	  necessary	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  whether	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  completed.	  His	  research,	  which	  was	  based	  on	  interviews	  with	  different	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  projects,	  concluded	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  unified	  enemy	  in	  Russia	  drover	  Azerbaijan,	  Georgia	  and	  Turkey	  to	  seek	  an	  alternative	  transport	  route	  in	  the	  BTC	  whereas	  differing	  views	  about	  whether	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Paul	  Stevens,	  "Cross-­‐Border	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Pipelines:	  Problems	  and	  Prospects,"(Joint	  UNDP/World	  Bank	  Energy	  Sector	  Management	  Assistance	  Programme,	  2003),	  45.	  42	  Ibid.,	  35.	  43	  Benjamin	  Sovacool,	  "The	  Interpretive	  Flexability	  of	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Pipelines:	  Case	  Studies	  from	  Southeast	  Asian	  and	  Caspian	  Sea	  "	  
Technological	  Forecasting	  and	  Social	  Change,	  no.	  78	  (2011).	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pipeline	  should	  be	  used	  to	  facilitate	  domestic	  consumption	  or	  drive	  exports	  stopped	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Trans	  ASEAN	  gas	  pipeline.	  	  	  Sovacool’s	  research	  is	  important	  to	  this	  question	  because	  it	  shows	  that	  different	  states	  become	  involved	  in	  pipelines	  for	  different	  reasons	  and	  that	  if	  those	  meanings	  do	  not	  align	  then	  it	  can	  be	  problematic.	  It	  demonstrates	  that	  meaning	  matters.	  Paul	  Steven’s	  ideas	  are	  important	  because	  they	  show	  that	  pipelines	  are	  susceptible	  to	  disputes	  because	  they	  involve	  different	  actors	  with	  different	  interests.	  The	  room	  that	  this	  leaves	  in	  the	  literature	  is	  to	  consider	  how	  these	  meanings	  or	  interests	  actually	  come	  about,	  why	  some	  meanings	  come	  to	  be	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  whilst	  others	  are	  marginalized.	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3.	  Conceptual	  Framework	  	  	  	  This	  thesis	  will	  use	  constructivism	  to	  examine	  why	  pipelines	  are	  susceptible	  to	  disputes.	  The	  core	  claim	  is	  that	  pipelines	  have	  different	  meanings	  to	  different	  states	  and	  this	  is	  important	  for	  understanding	  their	  success	  or	  otherwise.	  When	  the	  motivations	  of	  different	  actors	  do	  not	  align	  is	  when	  disputes	  occur.	  The	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  examining	  the	  processes	  of	  socialisation	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  these	  meanings.	  	  	  This	  section	  will	  discuss	  the	  core	  claims	  of	  constructivism,	  its	  different	  variants	  then	  it	  will	  develop	  the	  concept	  energy	  cultures	  to	  explain	  how	  domestic	  social	  structures	  around	  energy	  and	  the	  agents	  who	  operate	  within	  them	  contribute	  to	  the	  production	  of	  meanings.	  The	  conceptual	  framework	  has	  two	  main	  aspects;	  	   1) Identifying	  the	  structures	  of	  beliefs	  and	  social	  relationships	  that	  constitute	  a	  state’s	  energy	  culture	  	  2) Identifying	  how	  agents	  within	  aforementioned	  cultures	  have	  assigned	  particular	  meanings	  through	  processes	  of	  social	  interaction	  	  	  
3.1	  Constructivism	  	  The	  main	  theories	  of	  international	  relations,	  especially	  neorealism,	  are	  
materialist.	  This	  means	  that	  they	  explain	  state	  action	  based	  on	  physical	  characteristics	  such	  as	  economic	  or	  military	  distributions	  of	  power.	  Constructivists	  believe	  that	  the	  most	  important	  factors	  guiding	  state	  action	  are	  social.	  They	  argue	  that	  human	  interaction	  is	  influenced	  by	  ideas	  and	  not	  simply	  material	  factors.	  They	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  norms,	  values,	  knowledge	  and	  other	  ideational	  factors	  that	  are	  ‘intersubjectively’	  held	  and	  the	  influence	  that	  they	  have	  on	  politics.	  On	  an	  ontological	  level,	  constructivism	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumptions	  that	  structure	  and	  agency	  are	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mutually	  constitutive	  and	  reality	  consists	  of	  intersubjective	  meanings	  created	  by	  processes	  of	  social	  interaction.	  According	  to	  Checkel:	  	   It	  is	  not	  a	  theory	  but	  an	  approach	  to	  social	  inquiry	  based	  on	  two	  assumptions:	  (1)	  the	  environment	  in	  which	  agents/states	  take	  action	  is	  social	  as	  well	  as	  material;	  and	  (2)	  this	  setting	  can	  provide	  agents/states	  with	  understandings	  of	  their	  interests	  (it	  can	  ‘constitute’	  them)44	  	  For	  international	  relations,	  this	  means	  that	  features	  of	  international	  relations	  are	  not	  fixed	  but	  socially	  constructed	  and	  therefore	  subject	  to	  change.	  This	  can	  apply	  to	  material	  features	  of	  international	  relations	  such	  as	  perceptions	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  or	  to	  purely	  ideational	  features	  such	  as	  anarchy.	  But	  beyond	  these	  core	  assumptions	  constructivists	  differ	  in	  a	  number	  of	  important	  ways.	  	  	  An	  important	  difference	  is	  the	  constructivist	  epistemology,	  how	  they	  know	  what	  they	  know.	  Scholars	  from	  the	  post-­‐positivist	  persuasion	  	  ‘reject	  scientific	  style	  theorizing	  and	  stress	  the	  interpretive	  nature	  of	  social	  science’	  whilst	  positivist	  scholars	  allow	  for	  empirical	  theoretical	  insights	  in	  explaining	  international	  relations.45	  Generally,	  scholars	  from	  the	  positivist	  variety	  are	  concerned	  with	  identifying	  causal	  relationships	  between	  actors,	  norms,	  interests	  and	  identity.	  The	  post-­‐positivist	  scholars	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  look	  to	  the	  role	  of	  social	  discourses	  and	  linguistic	  constructions	  using	  ‘bottom	  up’	  inductive	  research	  strategies	  to	  identify	  how	  knowledge	  and	  power	  are	  connected.46	  This	  paper	  will	  employ	  ideas	  from	  the	  positivist	  branch	  of	  constructivism.	  It	  is	  setting	  out	  to	  uncover	  the	  meanings	  attributed	  to	  pipelines	  and	  it	  will	  assume	  therefore,	  that	  stable	  meanings	  such	  as	  identities,	  norms	  and	  cultures	  can	  be	  identified	  independent	  of	  interpretive	  biases.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Jeffrey	  Checkel,	  "The	  Constructivist	  Turn	  in	  International	  Relations	  Theory,"	  World	  Politics	  50	  no.	  2	  (1998):	  325.	  45	  Maysam	  Behravesh,	  "Constructivism:	  An	  Introduction,"	  (2011),	  http://www.e-­‐ir.info/2011/02/03/constructivism-­‐an-­‐introduction/.	  46	  Ibid.	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  Another	  important	  difference	  between	  constructivists	  is	  the	  level	  of	  analysis	  that	  they	  focus	  on.	  System	  level	  theorists	  such	  as	  Alexander	  Wendt	  consider	  how	  features	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  like	  anarchy,	  are	  socially	  constructed.	  The	  focus	  with	  this	  system	  level	  branch	  of	  constructivism	  is	  on	  ‘interactions	  between	  unitary	  state	  actors’	  and	  processes	  of	  mutual	  constitution	  taking	  place	  at	  the	  international	  level	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  what	  is	  happening	  within	  states.47	  Unit	  level	  explanations	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  give	  more	  weight	  to	  the	  domestic	  realm	  and	  how	  domestic	  social	  factors	  such	  as	  identity	  and	  culture	  can	  provide	  explanations	  for	  state	  interest.	  	  Key	  scholars	  from	  this	  branch	  include	  Peter	  Katzenstein	  and	  Alistair	  Iain	  Johnston.	  	  	  	  Focusing	  on	  security	  policies,	  Alastair	  Iain	  Johnston	  looks	  at	  how	  China’s	  
realpolitik	  approach	  to	  grand	  strategy	  has	  been	  borne	  out	  of	  its	  unique	  cultural	  and	  historical	  military	  experience.	  Katzenstein’s	  work,	  also	  on	  military	  and	  strategic	  cultures,	  locates	  Japan’s	  approach	  to	  national	  security	  within	  heavily	  contested	  social	  norms	  and	  institutional	  practices	  emerging	  out	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  defeat	  in	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  He	  describes	  the	  domestic	  environment	  as	  one	  where	  ‘actors	  contest	  norms	  and	  through	  political	  and	  social	  processes	  construct	  and	  reconstruct	  identities’.	  He	  says	  	  ‘The	  process	  of	  [identity]	  construction	  typically	  is	  explicitly	  political	  and	  pits	  conflicting	  actors	  against	  each	  other.’48	  Using	  concepts	  like	  culture	  and	  identity,	  these	  scholars	  have	  given	  insights	  into	  how	  domestic	  social	  environments	  and	  the	  actors	  within	  them	  can	  shape	  state	  interest.	  	  	  The	  most	  appropriate	  level	  for	  analysis	  for	  transnational	  pipelines	  is	  the	  unit	  level.	  	  Systemic	  level	  theories	  could	  give	  valuable	  insights	  into	  how	  state’s	  come	  to	  value	  the	  pursuit	  of	  such	  goals	  as	  economic	  growth	  energy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Ibid.	  48	  Peter	  Katzenstein,	  ed.	  The	  Culture	  of	  National	  Security:	  Norms	  and	  
Identity	  in	  World	  Politics,	  Introduction	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1996).	  26	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security	  and	  interdependence	  but	  the	  process	  by	  which	  pipelines	  come	  to	  attain	  the	  meanings	  that	  they	  have	  is	  predominately	  domestic	  and	  specific	  to	  each	  pipeline.	  No	  general	  international	  system	  theory	  could	  explain	  the	  interests	  of	  each	  state	  involved	  in	  pipeline	  projects	  because	  they	  are	  all	  different.	  For	  some	  pipelines	  the	  main	  driver	  is	  economic	  growth	  and	  for	  others	  it	  might	  be	  diversification	  of	  energy	  routes,	  some	  states	  are	  producers	  and	  some	  are	  suppliers.	  	  	  Constructivists	  also	  differ	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  weight	  they	  attach	  to	  structure	  and	  agency.	  While	  constructivists	  would	  all	  consider	  both	  structure	  and	  agency	  to	  be	  important,	  some	  favor	  explanations	  that	  focus	  more	  on	  structures	  and	  some	  that	  focus	  more	  on	  the	  role	  of	  agents.	  This	  thesis	  will	  consider	  the	  role	  of	  both	  structure	  and	  agency	  in	  the	  assigning	  of	  meanings	  to	  pipelines.	  Structures	  are	  cognitive	  frameworks,	  which	  direct	  the	  actions	  of	  actors	  in	  a	  social	  system.	  They	  might	  be	  informal	  rules	  or	  institutionalized	  practices	  like	  bureaucracies.49	  Agents	  (which	  might	  be	  states	  in	  international	  society	  or	  people	  in	  a	  domestic	  society)	  are	  influenced	  by	  structures	  in	  the	  beliefs,	  attitudes	  and	  roles	  that	  they	  hold	  but	  they	  also	  contribute	  to	  those	  structures.	  This	  is	  the	  process	  which	  constructivists	  call	  mutual	  constitution.	  	  	  
3.2	  Energy	  cultures	  	  	  	  3.2.1	  Structure	  	  This	  paper	  will	  consider	  the	  role	  of	  both	  structure	  and	  agency	  in	  assigning	  meanings	  to	  pipelines.	  The	  structural	  side	  of	  the	  analysis	  will	  use	  the	  term	  energy	  culture	  to	  consider	  the	  relevant	  beliefs	  about	  energy	  and	  how	  they	  are	  diffused	  amongst	  actors	  through	  social	  relationships.	  For	  example	  25%	  of	  Chinese	  students	  believe	  that	  China’s	  energy	  security	  is	  at	  ‘crisis	  level’.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Audie	  Klotz	  and	  Cecelia	  Lynch,	  Strategies	  for	  Research	  in	  Constructivist	  
International	  Relations(New	  York:	  M.E	  Sharpe,	  2007),	  44.	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Of	  those	  students,	  72%	  say	  the	  media	  is	  their	  main	  source	  of	  information	  about	  energy	  and	  74%	  say	  their	  education	  is	  their	  second	  source.50	  This	  sense	  of	  insecurity,	  and	  knowledge	  of	  where	  it	  comes	  from,	  can	  lend	  insights	  into	  why	  the	  Myanmar-­‐China	  pipeline	  means	  increased	  energy	  security	  in	  China.	  	  	  The	  term	  ‘culture‘	  denotes	  frameworks	  of	  knowledge,	  behaviors	  and	  social	  relationships.	  Katzenstein	  describes	  culture	  as	  a:	  	   ‘broad	  label	  that	  denotes	  collective	  models	  of	  nation-­‐state	  authority	  or	  identity,	  carried	  by	  custom	  or	  law.	  Culture	  refers	  to	  both	  a	  set	  of	  evaluative	  standards	  (such	  as	  norms	  and	  values)	  and	  a	  set	  of	  cognitive	  standards	  (such	  as	  rules	  and	  models)	  that	  define	  which	  social	  actors	  exist	  in	  a	  system,	  how	  they	  operate,	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  one	  another’51	  	  The	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  broad	  is	  useful	  because	  it	  allows	  the	  analysis	  of	  different	  relevant	  social	  aspects	  that	  can	  help	  to	  explain	  why	  one	  policy	  choice	  is	  selected	  from	  competing	  visions.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  culture	  can	  be	  a	  term	  so	  broad	  as	  to	  be	  meaningless	  so	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  specify	  certain	  aspects	  of	  culture	  that	  will	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  inquiry.	  This	  paper	  will	  consider	  how	  predominant	  beliefs	  about	  energy,	  and	  2)	  social	  relationships	  influence	  the	  production	  of	  meanings	  by	  constituting	  actors.	  	  	  3.2.2	  Agency	  	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  process	  by	  which	  pipelines	  have	  come	  to	  attain	  certain	  meanings	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  role	  of	  agency:	  how	  certain	  actors	  and	  their	  behaviors	  contribute	  to	  production	  of	  meanings.	  The	  agency	  aspect	  of	  the	  analysis	  will	  look	  at	  how	  actors	  within	  these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  David	  Zweig	  and	  Shulan	  Ye,	  "A	  Crisis	  Is	  Looming:	  China's	  Energy	  Challenge	  in	  the	  Eyes	  of	  University	  Students,"	  in	  China's	  Search	  for	  Energy	  
Security:	  Domestic	  Sources	  and	  International	  Implications,	  ed.	  Suisheng	  Zhao(Routledge,	  2013),	  29.	  51	  Katzenstein,	  The	  Culture	  of	  National	  Security:	  Norms	  and	  Identity	  in	  
World	  Politics,	  58.	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cultures	  have	  assigned	  meanings	  to	  the	  pipeline	  through	  processes	  of	  social	  interaction.	  	  	  	  When	  actors	  exercise	  their	  agency	  they	  can	  both	  reproduce	  and	  alter	  structures.	  For	  example,	  when	  policy-­‐makers,	  leaders	  and	  journalists	  pushed	  for	  the	  Myanmar-­‐China	  pipeline	  to	  be	  built	  in	  China,	  this	  reproduced	  the	  energy	  insecurity	  in	  China’s	  energy	  culture.	  By	  contrast,	  when	  social	  movements	  in	  Myanmar	  campaigned	  against	  the	  pipeline	  due	  to	  social	  and	  environmental	  impacts,	  this	  contributed	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  norms	  around	  responsible	  business	  in	  Myanmar’s	  energy	  industry.	  The	  way	  these	  agents	  are	  constituted	  by	  structures	  (their	  beliefs	  and	  social	  relations)	  and	  they	  way	  that	  they	  in	  turn	  constitute	  structures	  (through	  their	  actions	  and	  speech)	  is	  a	  process	  which	  constructivists	  call	  mutual	  constitution.	  	  	  Agents	  can	  be	  a	  range	  of	  different	  actors	  but	  in	  this	  analysis	  of	  energy	  in	  the	  domestic	  sphere	  agency	  will	  often	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  particular	  leaders,	  social	  movements	  or	  other	  political	  actors	  in	  contesting	  or	  reproducing	  meanings.	  The	  use	  of	  speech,	  as	  well	  as	  techniques	  such	  as	  symbolic	  politics	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  understanding	  how	  pipelines	  acquire	  meanings.	  	  	  Identifying	  agency	  involves	  tracing	  the	  role	  of	  individuals	  or	  groups	  in	  the	  production	  of	  certain	  meanings.	  It	  can	  be	  explained	  through	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  narrative	  that	  emphasizes	  the	  role	  of	  key	  actors.52	  Agents	  advance	  particular	  meanings	  and	  by	  tracing	  how	  they	  have	  made	  arguments	  and	  disseminated	  information,	  and	  by	  comparing	  this	  to	  changes	  in	  state	  behavior,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  identify	  how	  agents	  have	  influenced	  outcomes	  through	  the	  assignment	  of	  meanings.	  One	  way	  that	  agents	  can	  influence	  meanings	  is	  through	  speech,	  argument	  and	  persuasion.	  According	  to	  Finnemore	  ‘speech	  can	  also	  persuade;	  it	  can	  change	  peoples	  minds	  about	  what	  goals	  are	  valuable	  and	  about	  the	  roles	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Lynch,	  Strategies	  for	  Research	  in	  Constructivist	  International	  Relations.	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they	  play	  (or	  should	  play)	  in	  social	  life.	  When	  speech	  has	  these	  effects,	  it	  is	  doing	  important	  social	  construction	  work,	  creating	  new	  understandings	  and	  new	  social	  facts	  that	  reconfigure	  politics’.53	  Within	  their	  speech,	  agents	  use	  techniques	  such	  as	  symbolic	  politics.	  The	  use	  of	  these	  techniques	  by	  agents	  will	  be	  examined.	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4.	  The	  Myanmar-­‐China	  Pipelines	  	  
	  This	  section	  will	  give	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  China-­‐Myanmar	  pipelines	  such	  as	  origins	  of	  the	  project,	  geographical	  and	  economic	  factors	  and	  social	  and	  environmental	  impacts.	  	  
	  
Figure	  1	  China-­‐Myanmar	  pipelines	  (Reuters)	  	  The	  Sino-­‐Burmese	  pipelines	  (also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Shwe	  pipelines,	  the	  China-­‐Myanmar	  pipelines	  and	  the	  Kyaukphyu-­‐Kunming	  pipelines)	  are	  parallel	  oil	  and	  gas	  pipelines	  that	  connect	  Kyaukphyu	  in	  Rakhine	  State,	  Myanmar	  and	  Kunming	  in	  China’s	  Southwest	  Yunnan	  Province.	  	  Following	  a	  bilateral	  agreement	  between	  Myanmar	  and	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,	  a	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  (MoU)	  was	  signed	  in	  June	  2009	  to	  build	  the	  pipelines	  between	  the	  state-­‐owned	  China	  National	  Petroleum	  Corporation	  and	  the	  Myanmar	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Enterprise	  (subsidiary	  of	  Ministry	  of	  Energy).	  At	  this	  time	  Myanmar	  was	  still	  under	  control	  of	  the	  State	  Peace	  and	  Development	  Council,	  the	  official	  name	  of	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the	  military	  regime.54	  	  Construction	  began	  on	  the	  pipelines	  in	  June	  2010	  and	  the	  gas	  pipeline	  became	  operational	  in	  June	  2013.	  The	  oil	  pipeline	  underwent	  preliminary	  testing	  in	  January	  2015.	  Under	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  agreement	  holdings	  companies	  were	  set	  up	  for	  each	  pipeline	  in	  which	  CNPC	  has	  a	  controlling	  50.9	  per	  cent	  stake.55	  The	  CNPC	  was	  responsible	  for	  building	  the	  pipeline	  and	  the	  Myanmar	  government	  for	  providing	  security.	  The	  oil	  pipeline	  is	  approximately	  771km	  in	  length	  and	  begins	  at	  the	  port	  in	  Kyaukphyu	  where	  it	  is	  supplied	  with	  Saudi	  Arabian	  oil	  shipped	  in	  from	  the	  Middle	  East.	  It	  is	  designed	  to	  carry	  22	  million	  tons	  of	  crude	  per	  year	  (440,000	  barrels	  per	  day).56	  	  The	  crude	  oil	  pipeline	  and	  Made	  Island	  terminal	  were	  constructed	  with	  US	  $2.4532b	  foreign	  investment	  and	  US	  $1.204	  billion	  investment	  from	  the	  state.	  	  The	  approximately	  1800	  km	  gas	  pipeline	  delivers	  gas	  from	  the	  Shwe	  fields	  on	  Myanmar’s	  coast	  in	  the	  Bay	  of	  Bengal	  beyond	  Yunnan	  province	  to	  Guangxi.	  The	  gas	  pipeline	  is	  designed	  to	  carry	  10	  -­‐13billion	  cubic	  meters	  (bcm)	  per	  year	  from	  Myanmar’s	  Shwe	  natural	  gas	  fields	  in	  the	  Bay	  of	  Bengal.	  The	  terms	  in	  the	  MoU	  includes	  a	  30-­‐year	  purchasing	  agreement	  for	  gas.	  	  The	  available	  evidence	  indicates	  that	  the	  contract	  for	  the	  pipeline	  has	  already	  been	  renegotiated.	  Myanmar	  was	  originally	  going	  to	  be	  paid	  $150m	  USD	  in	  transit	  fees	  per	  year	  over	  the	  thirty	  year	  duration	  of	  the	  gas	  pipeline	  agreement	  as	  well	  as	  the	  below	  market	  rate	  of	  $4	  per	  MBTU.57	  After	  the	  new	  government	  took	  office	  in	  2011	  Energy	  Minister	  U	  Than	  Htay	  revealed	  in	  Parliament	  that	  eighty	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  gas	  would	  be	  sent	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  The	  SPDC	  was	  previously	  called	  the	  State	  Law	  and	  Order	  Restoration	  Council	  (SLORC)	  55	  Hong	  Kong	  registered	  companies	  are	  named	  the	  Southeast	  Asia	  Oil	  Pipeline	  Company	  Ltd	  and	  the	  Southeast	  Asia	  Gas	  Pipeline	  Company	  Ltd	  56	  The	  CNPC	  has	  led	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  storage	  and	  processing	  facility	  for	  the	  oil	  in	  Kyaukphyu	  with	  600,000	  cubic	  meters	  of	  storage	  capacity	  57	  Shwe	  Gas	  Movement,	  "Corridor	  of	  Power,"(Shwe	  Gas	  Movement,	  2011),	  9.	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China	  and	  twenty	  per	  cent	  would	  be	  reserved	  for	  domestic	  use.58	  As	  well	  as	  the	  agreed	  $13.8m	  fee	  and	  $1	  per	  tonne	  of	  crude	  Myanmar	  will	  reportedly	  now	  take	  10%	  of	  the	  crude	  oil,	  which	  would	  be	  two	  million	  tonnes	  per	  year	  if	  the	  pipeline	  operates	  at	  full	  capacity.59	  The	  pipelines,	  which	  cross	  through	  terrain	  including	  mountains,	  major	  rivers	  and	  virgin	  forests,	  are	  considered	  a	  considerable	  feat	  of	  engineering.60	  They	  pass	  through	  Rahkhine	  State,	  Magway	  Division,	  Mandalay	  Division	  and	  Shan	  State	  before	  crossing	  into	  China	  at	  Riuli.	  Passing	  through	  more	  than	  21	  towns	  and	  cities,	  the	  pipelines	  have	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  numerous	  research	  reports	  by	  local	  and	  international	  NGOs	  that	  have	  detailed	  the	  controversial	  and	  poorly	  executed	  land	  compensation	  practices,	  human	  rights	  abuses	  associated	  with	  the	  military	  presence,	  health	  and	  safety	  problems	  resulting	  in	  deaths	  of	  locals	  and	  workers	  and	  extensive	  environmental	  damage.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Adam	  Simpson,	  "Civil	  Society	  and	  Pipeline	  Politics	  in	  Myanmar(Burma):	  Energy	  Markets	  and	  Activist	  Environmental	  Governance	  "	  in	  New	  
Approaches	  to	  Building	  Markets	  in	  Asia(2013),	  11.	  59	  Ying	  Hongwei,	  "Chinese	  Investments	  in	  Myanmar:	  The	  Sino-­‐Myanmar	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Pipeline	  Project	  Could	  Become	  a	  Chess	  Piece	  "(Asien	  Haus,	  2014),	  3.	  60	  Ibid.,	  1.	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5.	  China:	  Breaking	  the	  Malacca	  Dilemma	  	  	  	  The	  main	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  show	  that	  China’s	  interest	  in	  the	  pipeline	  was	  socially	  constructed.	  The	  meaning	  assigned	  to	  the	  pipeline	  in	  China	  was	  that	  it	  would	  be	  a	  solution	  to	  China’s	  ‘Malacca	  dilemma’.	  This	  section	  will	  firstly	  consider	  the	  ideational	  environment	  or	  energy	  culture	  then	  examine	  the	  actors	  and	  processes	  of	  social	  construction	  that	  led	  to	  the	  Malacca	  Dilemma	  and	  then	  the	  pipeline	  being	  perceived	  as	  the	  best	  solution	  despite	  weak	  materialist	  rational.	  	  	  
5.1	  China’s	  energy	  culture	  	  	  This	  section	  will	  examine	  the	  main	  beliefs	  and	  social	  relationships	  that	  constitute	  China’s	  energy	  culture.	  The	  beliefs	  are	  vulnerability,	  distrust	  of	  international	  markets	  and	  institutions,	  ideology	  and	  the	  state	  centric	  approach.	  Then,	  examining	  social	  relationships,	  it	  will	  then	  consider	  how	  these	  beliefs	  are	  diffused	  through	  the	  organizational	  hierarchy	  of	  the	  energy	  bureaucracy	  and	  through	  the	  state-­‐controlled	  media.	  	  4.1.1	  Vulnerability	  	  A	  belief	  that	  is	  central	  to	  China’s	  energy	  culture	  is	  vulnerability	  to	  a	  cessation	  of	  oil	  supply.	  While	  coal,	  natural	  gas,	  and	  increasingly	  renewables,	  are	  important	  in	  the	  country’s	  energy	  mix,	  China’s	  energy	  security	  debate	  primarily	  focuses	  on	  the	  availability,	  reliability	  and	  affordability	  of	  oil.	  It	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  particularly	  vital	  because	  its	  availability	  underpins	  both	  economic	  and	  military	  power	  and	  because	  China’s	  dependence	  on	  oil	  imports	  is	  increasing	  year	  on	  year.	  This	  sesnse	  of	  vulnerability	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  material	  reality	  of	  dependence	  on	  imports	  combined	  with	  the	  perception	  of	  hostile	  foreign	  enemies.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  examine	  the	  beliefs	  of	  leadership	  in	  China	  because	  China’s	  top	  leadership	  determines	  the	  main	  energy	  goals	  and	  the	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framework	  through	  which	  they	  are	  pursued.	  The	  attitudes	  of	  leadership	  in	  China	  towards	  energy	  security	  have	  been	  shaped	  by	  the	  historical	  experience	  of	  disastrous	  oil	  shortages	  caused	  by	  foreigners.	  In	  the	  early	  1950s	  the	  Western	  bloc’s	  Coordinating	  Committee	  for	  Multilateral	  Export	  Controls	  (COCOM)	  put	  China	  under	  oil	  embargo	  and,	  with	  low	  domestic	  production	  capacity,	  China	  was	  forced	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  After	  the	  Sino-­‐Soviet	  split	  in	  the	  early	  1960s	  the	  oil	  supplies	  were	  cut	  off	  leading	  to	  disastrous	  shortages	  interrupting	  military	  activities	  and	  transport.	  61	  	  The	  discovery	  of	  several	  major	  domestic	  oil	  fields	  ushered	  in	  a	  period	  of	  self-­‐sufficiency	  from	  1963	  until	  1993	  when	  demand	  once	  again	  began	  to	  exceed	  domestic	  supply.	  The	  centrality	  of	  oil	  to	  conceptions	  of	  energy	  security	  is	  illustrated	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  first	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘energy	  security’	  (nengyuan	  anquan)	  in	  the	  ‘China	  Economic	  News	  library’	  database	  of	  periodicals	  was	  on	  the	  27th	  of	  March	  1994,	  a	  few	  months	  after	  China	  officially	  became	  a	  net	  energy	  importer	  of	  oil.	  The	  term	  ‘energy	  security’	  then	  appeared	  in	  41	  articles	  from	  1994	  to	  1999,	  1150	  from	  2001	  to	  2005	  and	  in	  1435	  from	  2006	  to	  2010.62	  	  The	  prevalence	  of	  this	  perception	  throughout	  the	  policy-­‐making	  apparatus	  is	  supported	  by	  public	  opinion	  research	  into	  the	  perspectives	  of	  policymakers	  towards	  energy	  issues.	  	  A	  recent	  study	  by	  Vlado	  Vivoda	  and	  Benjamin	  Sovacool	  (2012)	  researched	  the	  perspectives	  of	  individuals	  working	  in	  the	  energy	  sector	  from	  China,	  India	  and	  Japan	  on	  energy	  security.	  The	  survey	  asked	  the	  830	  respondents	  from	  academia,	  civil	  society,	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  government	  about	  16	  different	  dimensions	  of	  energy	  security	  from	  fossil	  fuels	  to	  pollution	  and	  water	  supply.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  findings	  highlighted	  was	  the	  difference	  in	  levels	  of	  actual	  reliance	  on	  fossil	  fuels	  and	  perceptions	  of	  insecurity	  between	  the	  three	  countries.	  The	  most	  important	  aspect	  of	  energy	  security	  to	  Chinese	  respondents	  was	  the	  supply	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  whereas	  to	  Japanese	  respondents,	  R&D	  and	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minimization	  of	  pollution	  were	  most	  important.63	  This	  is	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Japan	  relies	  on	  the	  import	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  much	  more	  than	  China	  does.64	  This	  research	  indicates	  that	  energy	  security	  is	  driven	  by	  ideational	  factors	  as	  well	  as	  material	  realities	  such	  as	  the	  level	  of	  dependence	  on	  imports.	  	  There	  is	  also	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  these	  views	  are	  prevalent	  throughout	  other	  aspects	  of	  Chinese	  society.	  A	  2009	  study	  into	  student	  attitudes,	  which	  canvassed	  approximately	  1000	  students	  across	  major	  universities,	  found	  that	  a	  vast	  majority	  thought	  energy	  imports	  could	  allow	  other	  countries	  to	  control	  China.	  57%	  thought	  external	  control	  was	  completely	  possible	  and	  only	  13%	  did	  not	  believe	  energy	  imports	  would	  let	  other	  states	  control	  China.	  Moreover,	  a	  majority	  of	  students	  also	  believed	  that	  ‘disagreements	  over	  energy	  will	  lead	  to	  military	  conflict	  among	  countries’	  with	  25%	  seeing	  this	  as	  ‘very	  likely	  and	  43%	  seeing	  this	  as	  ‘likely’.	  	  57%	  of	  the	  students	  saw	  the	  U.S	  as	  China’s	  greatest	  energy	  adversary	  and	  30%	  believed	  it	  was	  Japan.	  Only	  5%	  saw	  India	  as	  a	  rival	  despite	  India	  being	  one	  of	  China’s	  main	  competitors	  for	  international	  and	  regional	  energy	  resources.	  Nearly	  25%	  reported	  a	  ‘crisis’	  level	  of	  concern	  over	  China’s	  energy	  situation.65	  While	  this	  particular	  data	  only	  reflects	  the	  views	  of	  a	  small	  segment	  of	  society	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  an	  important	  one	  because	  these	  students	  will	  be	  the	  policy-­‐makers	  and	  thought	  leaders	  of	  tomorrow.	  	  The	  above	  survey	  data	  also	  links	  perceptions	  of	  China’s	  energy	  insecurity	  to	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  US	  and	  Japan	  as	  adversaries.	  Thus	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  enemy	  seeking	  to	  contain	  China	  and	  evitable	  conflict	  resulting	  from	  China’s	  increasing	  power	  is	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  China’s	  energy	  insecurity.	  	  4.1.2	  Distrust	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  international	  markets	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Chinese	  policy	  makers	  are	  also	  influenced	  by	  a	  strong	  distrust	  of	  international	  markets	  and	  institutions.	  One	  aspect	  of	  the	  distrust	  of	  markets	  is	  the	  belief	  that	  prices	  are	  not	  the	  result	  of	  supply	  and	  demand	  but	  rather	  they	  are	  manipulated	  by	  major	  international	  monopoly	  capital	  and	  international	  speculation	  capital.66	  The	  result	  is	  that	  China’s	  leaders	  feel	  that	  they	  cannot	  control	  the	  price,	  an	  important	  dimension	  of	  energy	  security.	  	  There	  is	  also	  the	  belief	  that	  market	  forces	  are	  not	  effective	  in	  allocating	  resources	  because	  of	  political	  interference.	  An	  important	  event	  that	  shaped	  this	  perception	  was	  the	  failed	  acquisition	  of	  Unocal	  by	  China’s	  state-­‐owned	  energy	  company	  the	  China	  National	  Offshore	  Oil	  Company	  in	  2005.	  	  The	  attempted	  $18.5b	  takeover	  of	  the	  American	  oil	  company	  caused	  huge	  public	  backlash	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  US	  House	  of	  Representatives	  voted	  overwhelmingly	  for	  the	  government	  to	  block	  the	  bid	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  national	  security.	  Subsequent	  Chinese	  state	  media	  reports	  pointed	  out	  the	  hypocrisy	  in	  US	  lectures	  to	  China	  over	  the	  years	  on	  the	  free	  market	  and	  non-­‐intervention	  by	  government.67	  This	  further	  contributed	  to	  the	  belief	  in	  China	  that	  China’s	  adversaries	  are	  using	  energy	  as	  a	  method	  of	  containing	  China’s	  rise.	  	  China’s	  suspicion	  of	  international	  energy	  institutions	  has	  also	  made	  it	  reluctant	  to	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  international	  energy	  governance.	  Because	  China	  is	  now	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  energy	  players,	  this	  in	  turn	  limits	  the	  overall	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  institutions.	  Despite	  being	  a	  state	  with	  strong	  energy	  insecurities,	  China	  is	  not	  a	  member	  of	  major	  international	  energy	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  International	  Energy	  Agency	  and	  the	  Energy	  Charter,	  which	  are	  designed	  to	  promote	  energy	  security.	  This	  choice	  stems	  from	  the	  belief	  that	  such	  institutions	  are	  Western	  dominated	  and	  would	  reduce	  China’s	  autonomy.	  This	  view	  was	  articulated	  by	  Zhang	  Yan,	  deputy	  director	  of	  the	  Economic	  Cooperation	  Office	  under	  the	  Department	  of	  Policy	  and	  Planning	  at	  the	  Chinese	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	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Affairs.	  Zhang	  explained	  that	  developing	  countries	  are	  simply	  passive	  participants	  of	  the	  international	  energy	  system	  and	  because	  China	  is	  a	  latecomer	  to	  western	  dominated	  international	  energy	  regimes	  it	  has	  no	  say	  in	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game.68	  Implicit	  in	  this	  belief	  also,	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  United	  States	  led	  order	  will	  seek	  to	  restrain	  China’s	  rise.	  	  4.1.3	  Ideology	  The	  broader	  ideological	  vision	  of	  Chinese	  leadership	  is	  also	  an	  obvious	  and	  important	  the	  dimension	  of	  the	  ideational	  environment	  in	  which	  actors	  operate.	  The	  central	  role	  of	  the	  government	  in	  energy	  planning	  is	  a	  legacy	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party’s	  (CCP)	  Soviet-­‐style	  economic	  model.	  This	  ideology	  evolved	  under	  the	  market-­‐oriented	  reforms	  of	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  and	  the	  third	  wave	  of	  China’s	  leadership	  but	  reverted	  back	  to	  a	  strengthened	  control	  over	  ‘strategic	  industries’	  under	  Hu	  Jintao	  and	  Wen	  Jiabao.	  This	  ideology	  was	  illustrated	  when	  in	  2006	  Li	  Rongrong,	  chairman	  of	  the	  State	  Assets	  Supervision	  and	  Administration	  Commission	  categorized	  oil	  and	  petrochemicals	  as	  one	  of	  the	  seven	  sectors	  over	  which	  the	  state	  will	  retain	  ‘absolute	  control’.69	  As	  well	  as	  being	  driven	  by	  perceptions	  of	  the	  international	  system	  and	  the	  self-­‐image	  of	  China	  as	  a	  ‘rising	  power’,	  this	  is	  due	  to	  the	  desire	  to	  control	  prices	  under	  the	  more	  socialist	  post-­‐Tiananmen	  approach	  that	  characterized	  the	  Hu-­‐Wen	  years.	  These	  ideas	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  key	  slogans	  of	  these	  years	  such	  as	  ‘the	  Moderately	  Well-­‐off	  Society’,	  ‘the	  Harmonious	  Society’	  and	  ‘Scientific	  Development’.	  	  4.1.4	  The	  state-­‐centric	  approach	  This	  broader	  ideological	  framework,	  perception	  of	  vulnerability	  and	  distrust	  of	  international	  actors	  and	  institutions	  have	  led	  to	  the	  belief	  amongst	  Chinese	  policymakers	  that	  a	  state-­‐centric	  approach	  to	  securing	  energy	  resources	  is	  best	  way	  of	  ensuring	  energy	  supply	  and	  affordability.	  This	  state	  centric	  approach	  involves	  the	  acquisition	  of	  resources	  by	  China’s	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state-­‐owned	  energy	  companies	  supported	  by	  bilateral	  engagement	  by	  the	  government.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  1992,	  just	  before	  China	  became	  a	  net	  energy	  importer,	  the	  Chinese	  leadership	  proposed	  that	  China	  would	  have	  to	  ‘fully	  exploit	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  resources’.70	  Since	  that	  time	  the	  three	  major	  Chinese	  national	  oil	  companies,	  China	  National	  Petroleum	  Corporation	  (CNPC),	  the	  China	  Petroleum	  and	  Chemical	  Corporation	  (Sinopec)	  and	  the	  China	  National	  Offshore	  Oil	  Corporation	  (CNOOC)	  have	  begun	  acquiring	  foreign	  petroleum	  and	  gas	  assets.	  By	  2005	  they	  had	  collectively	  invested	  in	  more	  than	  60	  oil	  and	  gas	  projects	  in	  30	  countries	  across	  Africa,	  Central	  Asia,	  Oceania	  and	  Latin	  America.71	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  suggests	  that	  this	  policy	  choice,	  and	  the	  beliefs	  that	  underpin	  it,	  are	  widely	  supported	  in	  China.	  	  A	  2009	  survey	  of	  230	  advanced	  students	  and	  energy	  experts	  in	  Beijing	  found	  the	  majority	  believed	  that	  government	  rather	  than	  the	  private	  sector	  should	  play	  the	  leading	  role	  in	  providing	  energy.	  Almost	  all	  viewed	  oil	  as	  a	  major	  problem	  in	  China’s	  ‘peaceful	  rise’	  and	  most	  believed	  that	  China	  should	  give	  more	  support	  to	  its	  oil	  companies	  to	  purchase	  and	  develop	  foreign	  oil	  and	  gas	  fields.72	  This	  indicates	  that	  this	  preference	  is	  not	  only	  a	  realpolitik	  response	  to	  material	  realities	  but	  rather	  the	  result	  of	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes	  that	  are	  prevalent	  amongst	  policy	  makers.	  	  4.1.5	  Social	  relationships	  The	  organisation	  of	  China’s	  energy	  policy-­‐making	  apparatus	  is	  an	  important	  dimension	  in	  understanding	  how	  certain	  ideas	  come	  to	  be	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  whilst	  others	  are	  marginalized.	  	  The	  top	  leadership	  sets	  the	  overarching	  framework	  of	  energy	  planning	  and	  it	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  ministries	  and	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  to	  develop	  and	  implement	  policy.	  In	  shaping	  this	  vision,	  the	  leadership	  relies	  on	  information	  from	  think	  tanks	  that	  provide	  information,	  analyses	  and	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recommendations.	  These	  include	  the	  Development	  Research	  Centre	  of	  the	  State	  Council	  and	  the	  NDRC	  Energy	  Research	  Issue.	  These	  recommendations	  influence	  policy	  choices	  but	  the	  leadership	  themselves	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  guiding,	  funding	  and	  deciding	  research	  questions.73	  This	  politicization	  means	  that	  the	  information	  underlying	  overarching	  policy	  goals	  is	  unlikely	  to	  challenge	  entrenched	  assumptions	  and	  beliefs	  about	  energy	  security.	  	  	  Similarly,	  ministries	  and,	  especially	  state	  owned	  enterprises,	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  formulating	  policy	  options	  but	  the	  direction	  is	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  the	  nomenklatura	  system,	  a	  hierarchical	  system	  of	  appointing	  personnel	  whereby	  all	  of	  the	  senior	  management	  of	  SOEs	  and	  ministries	  are	  appointed	  by	  the	  Communist	  Party’s	  Organization	  Department.74	  The	  result	  is	  that	  different	  actors	  involved	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  policy	  compete	  for	  the	  support	  of	  senior	  leadership	  and	  rarely	  collaborate	  or	  even	  engage	  with	  one	  another	  in	  debate	  on	  different	  energy	  policy	  options.75	  This	  results	  in	  ‘stove	  piping’,	  which	  means	  that	  ideas	  are	  transferred	  vertically	  throughout	  institutions	  but	  not	  horizontally	  between	  them	  where	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  subjected	  to	  critical	  analysis.	  	  The	  media	  and	  the	  education	  system	  in	  China	  are	  also	  important	  social	  relationships	  by	  which	  views	  are	  diffused.	  A	  survey	  of	  over	  1000	  students	  at	  top	  universities	  in	  China	  on	  energy	  security	  found	  that	  72%	  thought	  the	  news	  media	  was	  their	  most	  important	  source	  of	  information	  on	  energy	  and	  74%	  thought	  the	  education	  system	  was	  their	  second	  most	  important	  source	  of	  information.76	  Both	  the	  media	  and	  the	  education	  system	  in	  China	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had	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  state	  control	  so	  this	  is	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  understanding	  how	  beliefs	  about	  energy	  security	  come	  to	  be	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted.	  	  China’s	  energy	  culture	  is	  therefore	  made	  up	  of	  central	  beliefs	  about	  the	  international	  system,	  foreign	  adversaries	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  securing	  energy	  resources.	  The	  high	  degree	  of	  politicization	  of	  the	  bureaucracy,	  education	  and	  the	  media	  diffuses	  these	  views	  throughout	  the	  decision-­‐making	  apparatus	  and	  society.	  	  
4.2	  The	  social	  construction	  of	  the	  Malacca	  dilemma	  	  This	  section	  will	  examine	  how	  actors	  constituted	  by	  this	  cultural	  environment	  have	  constructed	  the	  China-­‐Myanmar	  pipeline	  as	  a	  way	  to	  mitigate	  to	  China’s	  energy	  insecurities.	  It	  will	  consider	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  both	  the	  ‘Malacca	  dilemma‘	  and	  then	  the	  pipeline	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  dilemma.	  	  	  An	  important	  process	  that	  led	  to	  the	  decision	  to	  build	  the	  Myanmar	  China	  pipeline	  was	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  the	  ‘Malacca	  dilemma’.	  The	  key	  driver	  of	  the	  pipelines	  construction	  was	  the	  need	  to	  find	  a	  solution	  to	  this	  problem.	  The	  ‘Malacca	  dilemma’	  is	  the	  perceived	  strategic	  vulnerability	  whereby	  some	  80%	  of	  China’s	  oil	  imports	  are	  shipped	  by	  tanker	  through	  the	  narrow	  shipping	  straits	  between	  the	  Malay	  Peninsula	  and	  the	  Indonesian	  island	  of	  Sumatra.	  The	  strait	  is	  the	  main	  shipping	  channel	  between	  the	  Indian	  and	  Pacific	  oceans	  and	  around	  one	  quarter	  of	  the	  world’s	  traded	  goods	  pass	  through	  yearly.	  Approximately	  15.2	  million	  barrels	  of	  oil	  pass	  through	  the	  strait	  per	  day,	  which	  is	  around	  2km	  wide	  at	  its	  narrowest	  point.77	  	  	  The	  term	  ‘Malacca	  dilemma’	  (Maliujia	  Kunju)	  came	  out	  of	  a	  speech	  given	  by	  Chinese	  President	  Hu	  Jintao	  to	  senior	  party	  members	  at	  an	  economic	  work	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conference	  in	  2003.	  President	  Hu	  explained	  that	  ‘certain	  major	  powers	  have	  all	  along	  encroached	  on	  and	  tried	  to	  control	  navigation	  through	  the	  strait’.78	  The	  concept	  was	  then	  picked	  up	  and	  popularized	  by	  the	  Chinese	  media	  who	  discussed	  the	  need	  to	  ‘break’	  (po)	  the	  dilemma.79	  One	  party	  controlled	  newspaper	  declared	  ‘it	  is	  no	  exaggeration	  to	  say	  that	  whoever	  controls	  the	  Strait	  of	  Malacca	  will	  also	  have	  a	  stranglehold	  on	  the	  energy	  route	  of	  China’.80	  The	  Chinese	  media	  therefore	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  constructing	  and	  reproducing	  the	  Malacca	  dilemma.	  Zha	  Daojiong	  explains	  how	  Chinese	  policy	  makers	  view	  the	  ‘idea	  of	  the	  Malacca	  Dilemma’:	  	  
Unspecified	  hostile	  powers	  may	  decide	  to	  deliberately	  sabotage	  oil	  tankers	  bound	  for	  China.	  In	  response,	  China	  would	  need	  naval	  escort	  capacity	  in	  the	  Strait	  of	  Malacca	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea.	  However,	  should	  it	  project	  blue	  water	  naval	  power	  into	  Southeast	  Asian	  waters,	  China	  risks	  being	  treated	  as	  a	  threat.	  States	  in	  maritime	  Southeast	  Asia	  may	  credibly	  choose	  to	  involve	  outside	  powers	  hostile	  to	  China	  for	  self-­‐protection.81	  According	  to	  Zha	  this	  ‘argument	  errs	  by	  taking	  one	  scenario	  –	  all	  out	  war	  –	  as	  a	  constant	  possibility’.82	  It	  can	  be	  reasonably	  assumed	  that	  the	  unspecified	  hostile	  powers	  or	  those	  President	  Hu	  describes	  as	  ‘certain	  major	  powers’	  are	  the	  United	  States	  and	  key	  allies	  such	  as	  Japan.	  This	  is	  supported	  by	  comments	  published	  in	  official	  media	  later	  that	  year.	  Zhu	  Xingshan	  from	  the	  State	  Commission	  for	  Economic	  Development	  and	  Reform	  was	  quoted	  as	  saying	  ‘People	  are	  worried	  about	  SOMI	  [State	  of	  Malacca	  Imbroglio]	  for	  fears	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Marc	  Lanteigne,	  "China's	  Maritime	  Security	  and	  the	  'Malacca	  Dilemma'	  "	  
Asian	  Security	  4,	  no.	  2	  (2008):	  143.	  79	  Ibid.,	  144.	  80	  Ian	  Storey,	  "China's	  'Malacca	  Dilemma'	  "	  The	  Jamestown	  Foundation,	  http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2873.html.	  81	  Zha	  Daojiong,	  "Oil	  Pipeline	  from	  China	  to	  Myanmar:	  Competing	  Perspectives,"	  in	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  ed.	  Yang	  Razali	  Kassim(RSIS	  Nanyang	  Technological	  University,	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of	  the	  U.S	  going	  for	  the	  jugular’.83	  	  While	  China	  perceives	  the	  threat	  of	  the	  strait	  as	  primarily	  geopolitical	  (and	  coming	  from	  states),	  other	  states	  in	  the	  region	  such	  as	  South	  Korea	  and	  Japan	  have	  perceived	  threat	  presented	  by	  the	  strait	  as	  being	  from	  piracy	  or	  other	  non-­‐state	  actors	  such	  as	  terrorists.	  	  Instead	  in	  partaking	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  international	  rules	  and	  institutions	  to	  secure	  the	  shipping	  route,	  China	  has	  viewed	  the	  US	  and	  Japan’s	  efforts	  to	  step	  up	  anti-­‐piracy	  measures	  as	  a	  pretext	  to	  increase	  their	  naval	  presence	  in	  the	  area	  and	  has	  opposed	  a	  range	  of	  anti-­‐piracy	  initiatives.84	  Considering	  aforementioned	  energy	  cultures	  is	  an	  important	  way	  to	  explain	  how	  China	  has	  viewed	  and	  responded	  to	  the	  threat	  differently	  to	  Japan.	  	  Both	  China’s	  perception	  of,	  and	  response	  to,	  the	  threat	  of	  the	  Malacca	  dilemma	  cannot	  be	  explained	  in	  purely	  material	  terms.	  Western	  analysts	  have	  dismissed	  this	  possibility	  as	  	  ‘far	  fetched’	  and	  a	  ‘conspiracy	  theory’.85	  As	  one	  scholar	  has	  pointed	  out,	  by	  blockading	  the	  strait,	  the	  United	  States	  would	  also	  cut	  off	  shipping	  to	  important	  allies	  such	  as	  Japan	  and	  South	  Korea.86	  Moreover,	  the	  importance	  of	  China	  to	  the	  global	  economy	  means	  any	  blockade	  would	  be	  a	  disaster	  for	  the	  United	  States	  as	  well	  as	  China.	  	  But	  by	  considering	  the	  ideational	  environment	  within	  which	  China’s	  policy	  makers	  operate	  this	  behavior	  can	  be	  explained.	  The	  ‘Malacca	  dilemma’	  rests	  on	  assumptions	  about	  energy	  security	  and	  the	  international	  system	  that	  have	  emerged	  from	  culture	  consisting	  of	  beliefs	  and	  political	  structures.	  	  	  
4.3	  A	  Solution	  to	  the	  Malacca	  dilemma	  	  The	  social	  construction	  of	  the	  ‘Malacca	  Dilemma’	  by	  China’s	  leadership,	  policymakers	  and	  the	  media	  led	  to	  a	  number	  of	  different	  suggestions	  from	  think-­‐tanks,	  policymakers	  and	  academia	  as	  to	  how	  the	  problem	  could	  be	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  The	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  July	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mitigated.	  Here	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  observe	  a	  process	  of	  mutual	  constitution	  where	  an	  ideational	  structure,	  (‘Malacca	  dilemma’),	  is	  reproduced	  by	  agents	  (academics,	  policymakers)	  in	  their	  search	  for	  a	  solution.	  	  	  Analysts	  and	  policy-­‐makers	  proposed	  a	  variety	  of	  ideas	  about	  how	  the	  problem	  could	  be	  solved.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  suggestions	  was	  to	  build	  a	  $20b	  canal	  across	  Thailand’s	  Kra	  Isthmus.	  It	  ultimately	  failed	  to	  gain	  traction	  after	  opposition	  from	  Thai	  leadership	  and	  the	  large	  price	  tag.	  Another	  suggestion	  was	  a	  pipeline	  from	  Gwadar	  in	  Pakistan	  to	  Xinjiang.	  This	  idea	  failed	  to	  due	  to	  technical	  issues	  and	  political	  instability	  in	  Pakistan.	  Another	  suggestion	  was	  a	  pipeline	  that	  would	  travel	  through	  Iran,	  India,	  Pakistan	  and	  finally	  on	  to	  China.	  This	  failed	  to	  gain	  the	  necessary	  cooperation	  needed	  to	  move	  ahead.87	  	  The	  successful	  idea	  came	  from	  a	  group	  of	  three	  academics	  in	  China’s	  southwest	  Yunnan	  Province.	  Professors	  Li	  Chenyang,	  Qu	  Jianwen	  and	  Wu	  Lei	  proposed	  the	  idea	  of	  building	  an	  oil	  pipeline	  from	  Sittwe	  in	  Myanmar’s	  Rahkhine	  State	  to	  Kunming	  in	  Yunnan	  Province	  to	  China’s	  State	  Council	  through	  the	  Yunnan	  Provincial	  Government.	  The	  plan	  was	  first	  published	  in	  2004	  in	  Liaowang	  Dongfang	  Zhoukan	  [Oriental	  Outlook],	  a	  leading	  policy	  journal	  owned	  by	  Xinhua,	  a	  state	  media	  outlet.88	  	  Li	  Chenyang	  gained	  significant	  exposure	  from	  the	  proposal	  and	  promoted	  the	  project	  in	  the	  media.	  	  Highlighting	  the	  threat	  of	  foreign	  interference	  with	  China’s	  energy	  supplies	  he	  was	  quoted	  in	  one	  story	  saying	  ‘the	  reality	  is	  that	  the	  Americans	  want	  to	  control	  the	  Strait	  of	  Malacca…For	  China	  to	  fall	  under	  American	  control	  is	  a	  very	  risky	  thing’.	  89	  The	  plan	  was	  on	  the	  central	  government’s	  agenda	  within	  months	  and	  was	  supported	  by	  China’s	  state	  owned	  media	  outlets.	  On	  July	  11th	  Chinese	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Premier	  Wen	  Jianbao	  and	  Myanmar	  Prime	  Minister	  Khin	  Nyunt	  discussed	  the	  plan	  for	  the	  pipeline.90	  Then	  on	  July	  30th	  Li	  Lianzhong,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  economic	  department	  at	  the	  Policy	  Research	  Office	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  Central	  Committee,	  announced	  a	  10-­‐point	  strategic	  program	  for	  Chinese	  energy	  safety	  at	  a	  conference	  in	  Beijing	  which	  included	  the	  plan	  to	  build	  the	  Sino-­‐Burmese	  pipelines.91	  	  Continuing	  to	  promote	  the	  project,	  In	  August	  of	  that	  year	  the	  same	  three	  scholars	  published	  an	  op-­‐ed	  in	  Cankao	  Xiaoxi	  (Reference	  News)	  giving	  five	  reasons	  why	  the	  pipeline	  should	  be	  built.	  Firstly,	  it	  would	  allow	  exports	  to	  avoid	  the	  Strait	  of	  Malacca.	  Secondly,	  the	  route	  would	  be	  1200km	  shorter	  than	  shipping	  to	  Guangzhou	  then	  on	  to	  Southwest	  China.	  Thirdly,	  financing	  the	  pipeline	  construction	  would	  limit	  the	  influence	  other	  countries	  might	  have	  on	  Myanmar	  and	  turn	  the	  country	  into	  a	  strategic	  buffer	  zone	  for	  China.	  Fourthly,	  the	  history,	  current	  status	  and	  future	  prospect	  of	  Myanmar-­‐China	  relations	  would	  guarantee	  the	  security	  of	  the	  pipeline.	  Finally,	  building	  the	  pipeline	  would	  be	  cheaper	  than	  other	  routes	  because	  there	  is	  already	  a	  400km	  long	  railway	  in	  operation	  and	  plans	  to	  connect	  the	  remaining	  500km	  between	  Sittwe	  and	  Kunming.92	  Through	  this	  public	  argumentation	  these	  actors	  were	  able	  to	  socially	  construct	  the	  pipeline	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  ‘Malacca	  dilemma’.	  	  The	  agency	  of	  the	  China	  National	  Petroleum	  Corporation	  and	  its	  CEO	  Jiang	  Jiemin	  was	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  project’s	  success.	  While	  Jiang	  used	  the	  Malacca	  dilemma	  to	  push	  the	  pipeline,	  personal	  ambition	  and	  competition	  between	  national	  oil	  companies	  are	  also	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  for	  the	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company’s	  support.	  The	  CNPC	  became	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  advocates	  for	  the	  pipeline,	  using	  the	  symbol	  of	  the	  ‘Malacca	  dilemma’	  to	  push	  the	  pipeline	  plan	  to	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  government,	  where	  CNPC’s	  senior	  staff,	  with	  the	  rank	  of	  minister,	  have	  access.	  	  Jiang	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  ‘political	  businessman’	  who	  often	  gave	  speeches	  on	  the	  national	  and	  social	  responsibility	  of	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises.93	  Jiang	  went	  against	  the	  advice	  of	  planners	  and	  technicians	  to	  throw	  CNPC’s	  support	  behind	  the	  pipeline	  and	  promote	  it	  at	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  central	  leadership.94	  He	  also	  promoted	  the	  project	  to	  the	  public	  in	  media	  interviews,	  perpetuating	  the	  narrative	  that	  it	  would	  mitigate	  China’s	  energy	  insecurities.	  Locating	  the	  need	  to	  build	  the	  project	  in	  China’s	  ‘Malacca	  dilemma’,	  Jiang	  made	  statements	  such	  as	  ‘the	  Sino-­‐Myanmar	  Pipelines	  will	  diversify	  the	  methods	  and	  sources	  of	  crude	  oil	  sources’.95	  In	  this	  speech	  and	  behavior	  Jiang	  was	  an	  important	  agent	  in	  this	  process	  of	  social	  construction.	  	  Jiang	  came	  under	  criticism	  through	  his	  time	  as	  CEO	  of	  CNPC	  for	  undertaking	  projects	  to	  please	  Beijing	  instead	  of	  those	  that	  made	  commercial	  and	  practical	  sense.96	  This	  demonstrates	  the	  workings	  of	  China’s	  energy	  culture	  whereby	  projects	  are	  pushed	  for	  ideological	  rather	  than	  practical	  reasons.	  Jiang	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  key	  figure	  in	  ‘China’s	  determined	  expansion	  of	  its	  energy	  empire	  overseas’	  and	  along	  with	  the	  China-­‐Myanmar	  pipeline	  he	  was	  behind	  the	  push	  for	  pipelines	  between	  China	  and	  Russia	  and	  China	  and	  Central	  Asia.97	  The	  fact	  that	  Jiemin	  was	  promoted	  (before	  later	  being	  purged)	  to	  chairman	  of	  the	  State	  Assets	  Supervision	  and	  Administration	  Committee,	  a	  major	  role	  overseeing	  all	  of	  China’s	  state	  owned	  enterprises,	  demonstrates	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  nomenklatura	  system	  of	  hierarchical	  appointment	  and	  the	  way	  that	  ideology	  is	  diffused	  through	  the	  energy	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apparatus.	  	  	  The	  competitive	  nature	  of	  China’s	  NOCs	  also	  explains	  CNPC’s	  enthusiasm	  to	  lead	  the	  project.	  In	  the	  first	  few	  years	  after	  energy	  self-­‐sufficiency	  ended	  in	  China	  in	  1993,	  Beijing	  reorganized	  China’s	  main	  national	  oil	  companies	  to	  be	  more	  competitive	  both	  locally	  and	  internationally.	  This	  involved	  the	  redistribution	  of	  assets	  between	  the	  two	  major	  players	  the	  China	  National	  Petroleum	  Company	  and	  Sinopec	  so	  they	  would	  operate	  as	  two	  vertically	  integrated	  entities	  instead	  of	  monopolizing	  upstream	  (CNPC)	  and	  refining	  (Sinopec).	  Sinopec	  had	  a	  dominant	  market	  share	  in	  China’s	  southwestern	  provinces	  and	  CNPC	  saw	  the	  pipeline	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  get	  a	  foothold	  in	  the	  region’s	  downstream	  market,	  which	  was	  being	  serviced	  primarily	  by	  the	  Maoming-­‐Kunming	  pipeline	  operated	  by	  Sinopec.98	  This	  demonstrates	  that	  while	  CNPC	  and	  Jiang	  Jiemin	  had	  a	  number	  of	  ulterior	  motivations	  for	  supporting	  the	  pipeline	  project,	  they	  used	  the	  symbol	  of	  the	  ‘Malacca	  dilemma’	  to	  push	  the	  project	  and	  in	  the	  process	  became	  important	  agents	  in	  assigning	  that	  meaning	  to	  it.	  	  	  The	  decision	  to	  build	  the	  gas	  pipeline	  on	  the	  Chinese	  side	  was	  less	  about	  security	  of	  supply	  and	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  naval	  blockade	  and	  more	  about	  supply	  and	  demand.	  The	  decision	  to	  build	  the	  parallel	  pipeline	  came	  out	  of	  the	  lengthy	  discussions	  over	  the	  crude	  oil	  pipeline	  and	  the	  cost	  effectiveness	  of	  laying	  two	  pipelines	  at	  once	  incentivized	  the	  project.	  China’s	  gas	  demand	  was	  rapidly	  growing	  and	  proven	  reserves	  in	  Myanmar	  increased	  from	  10.1	  to	  17.5	  trillion	  cubic	  feet	  in	  the	  period	  2000	  to	  2008.	  It	  was	  also	  driven	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  Chinese	  NOCs	  had	  secured	  12	  hydrocarbon	  projects	  in	  Myanmar.99100	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  60.	  99	  Ibid.,	  61.	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  Sinopec,	  China	  National	  Offshore	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4.4	  ‘Fundamentally	  flawed’	  	  The	  economic	  and	  security	  rational	  behind	  both	  the	  oil	  and	  the	  gas	  pipeline	  has	  been	  widely	  disputed	  by	  Chinese	  and	  international	  analysts.	  This	  highlights	  the	  important	  role	  that	  social	  construction	  and	  China’s	  highly	  politicized	  energy	  culture	  played	  in	  the	  pipelines	  success.	  Erickson	  and	  Collins	  (2011)	  argue	  that	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  Burma-­‐China	  pipeline	  will	  increase	  supply	  security	  is	  ‘fundamentally	  flawed’.101	  They	  point	  out	  that	  pipelines	  are	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  sabotage	  and	  military	  interdiction	  than	  seaborne	  shipping	  which	  is	  more	  flexible	  and	  can	  be	  rerouted	  for	  minimal	  cost.	  This	  echoes	  comments	  by	  prominent	  Chinese	  academics	  such	  as	  Zha	  Daojiong	  (2009)	  who	  argues	  that	  the	  pipeline	  ‘doesn’t	  make	  much	  sense	  since	  during	  combat,	  a	  pipeline	  that	  is	  fixed	  and	  immobile	  makes	  a	  much	  easier	  target	  than	  a	  moving	  tanker	  in	  the	  ocean’.102	  While	  the	  pipelines	  are	  buried,	  the	  pumping	  stations	  are	  not	  and	  these	  could	  be	  easily	  targeted	  by	  air	  forces	  or	  ordinance	  in	  a	  conflict	  and	  the	  multimillion	  dollar	  pumps	  can	  take	  up	  to	  a	  year	  to	  replace,	  stopping	  all	  oil	  transit	  in	  the	  process	  if	  multiple	  stations	  were	  destroyed.103	  As	  well	  as	  this	  the	  pipeline	  passes	  through	  a	  number	  of	  active	  conflict	  areas	  where	  the	  Myanmar	  army	  is	  fighting	  armed	  ethnic	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Kachin	  Independence	  Army	  (KIA),	  the	  Ta’ang	  National	  Liberation	  Army	  (TNLA)	  and	  the	  Shan	  State	  Army	  North	  (SSA-­‐N).104	  	  Zhao	  Hong	  (2010)	  believes	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  oil	  pipeline	  on	  China’s	  energy	  supply	  ‘is	  likely	  to	  be	  marginal’.	  At	  full	  capacity	  of	  440,000	  barrels	  per	  day	  (b/d)	  the	  pipeline	  can	  only	  deliver	  11%	  of	  China’s	  oil	  needs.	  Based	  on	  an	  average	  growth	  rate	  of	  3.7%	  he	  points	  out	  that	  by	  2015	  it	  will	  only	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account	  for	  6.7%	  and	  by	  2030	  only	  3.4%.105	  Similarly,	  Ma	  Hong,	  a	  researcher	  at	  the	  China	  University	  of	  Petroleum’s	  China	  Energy	  Strategic	  Research	  Institute	  said	  ’22	  million	  tonnes	  of	  oil	  is	  a	  drop	  in	  the	  ocean’	  and	  the	  Burmese	  pipelines	  will	  not	  make	  much	  difference.106	  Another	  prominent	  oil	  and	  gas	  expert,	  Tong	  Xiaoguang	  who	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Academy	  of	  Engineering	  Sciences	  was	  even	  harsher	  with	  his	  criticism	  saying	  ‘the	  idea	  that	  the	  Burmese	  pipelines	  will	  relieve	  the	  Malacca	  problem	  is	  false’.107	  The	  fact	  that	  prominent	  experts	  have	  denounced	  the	  logic	  suggests	  that	  social	  and	  political	  explanations	  for	  the	  pipelines	  construction	  may	  be	  more	  useful	  than	  economic,	  technical	  and	  security	  based	  answers.	  	  	  Similarly,	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  first	  year	  of	  operation	  of	  the	  gas	  pipeline	  raised	  serious	  doubts	  about	  that	  pipelines	  commercial	  viability.	  Data	  released	  in	  July	  2014	  by	  CNPC	  showed	  that	  in	  the	  gas	  pipelines	  first	  year	  of	  operation	  it	  transferred	  1.87	  billion	  cubic	  meters	  (bcm)	  of	  gas,	  which	  amounts	  to	  less	  than	  20%	  of	  the	  12	  bcm	  capacity.	  This	  amounted	  to	  a	  loss	  of	  about	  $280m	  and	  comes	  despite	  CNPC	  marketing	  projections	  it	  would	  operate	  in	  the	  first	  year	  at	  50%.108	  In	  fact,	  nearly	  all	  Chinese	  invested	  gas	  pipelines	  operated	  overseas	  lose	  money.	  Because	  domestic	  gas	  is	  heavily	  subsidized,	  the	  more	  gas	  that	  is	  imported	  via	  pipeline,	  the	  more	  state	  owned	  enterprises	  stand	  to	  lose	  and	  this	  explains	  why	  other	  pipelines,	  such	  as	  China’s	  central	  Asian	  pipelines,	  are	  operating	  at	  below	  50%	  of	  their	  capacity.109	  The	  explanation	  for	  the	  pipelines	  is	  not	  in	  commercial	  viability	  but	  rather	  the	  need	  to	  diversify	  supply	  routes.	  	  	  Understanding	  the	  attitudes	  of	  leadership,	  energy	  experts	  and	  important	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segments	  of	  Chinese	  society	  as	  well	  as	  the	  bureaucratic	  structure	  and	  practices	  associated	  with	  energy	  gives	  important	  insights	  into	  why	  the	  Sino-­‐Burmese	  pipeline	  came	  to	  be	  accepted	  as	  an	  appropriate	  way	  to	  mitigate	  China’s	  energy	  insecurities.	  Energy	  security,	  as	  a	  national	  interest,	  is	  not	  only	  a	  rational	  response	  to	  material	  realities	  but	  also	  a	  social	  construct	  born	  out	  of	  domestic	  culture	  and	  shaped	  by	  important	  players	  in	  the	  energy	  sector	  and	  political	  arena.	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5.	  Myanmar	  	  The	  main	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  show	  that	  interests	  can	  change	  with	  processes	  of	  social	  construction.	  This	  section	  will	  begin	  with	  examining	  Myanmar’s	  energy	  culture	  and	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  political	  transition	  has	  had	  on	  it.	  It	  will	  argue	  that	  Myanmar	  is	  transitioning	  away	  from	  a	  rentier	  energy	  culture	  as	  new	  actors	  emerge	  setting	  norms	  of	  local	  resource	  ownership	  and	  social	  and	  environmental	  responsibility.	  	  	  Within	  this	  context,	  the	  role	  of	  social	  movements	  in	  assigning	  new	  meanings	  to	  the	  China	  Myanmar	  pipeline	  will	  be	  examined.	  Challenging	  the	  government’s	  narrative	  of	  economic	  development	  and	  modernization,	  these	  actors	  have	  embedded	  the	  pipeline	  in	  national	  discussions	  of	  social	  and	  environmental	  responsibility,	  Chinese	  exploitation	  of	  Myanmar’s	  resources	  and	  self-­‐determination.	  It	  will	  finish	  by	  considering	  impact	  that	  this	  new	  meaning	  has	  had	  on	  the	  pipeline.	  	  	  
5.1	  Myanmar’s	  changing	  energy	  culture	  	  	  This	  section	  will	  consider	  the	  beliefs	  and	  social	  relationships	  than	  constituted	  Myanmar’s	  energy	  culture	  under	  the	  military	  junta	  then	  examine	  how	  it	  has	  changed	  with	  Myanmar’s	  political	  transition.	  Unlike	  China,	  which	  could	  be	  characterized	  as	  having	  an	  energy	  culture	  of	  insecurity,	  Myanmar	  has	  had	  a	  rentier	  energy	  culture.	  The	  culture	  from	  which	  the	  pipeline	  emerged	  in	  Myanmar	  was	  a	  highly	  centralized	  political	  structure	  where	  the	  junta	  primarily	  viewed	  energy	  resources	  as	  a	  much-­‐needed	  source	  of	  export	  revenue.	  China	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  favorable	  economic	  partner	  and	  source	  of	  foreign	  direct	  investment,	  regions	  populated	  by	  ethnic	  minorities	  were	  predominately	  seen	  as	  a	  problem	  to	  be	  pacified	  and	  natural	  resources	  were	  viewed	  as	  the	  property	  of	  the	  central	  government	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  union.	  The	  political	  environment	  in	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Myanmar	  precluded	  a	  public	  debate	  about	  the	  pipeline	  and	  official	  government	  narratives	  were	  about	  the	  economic	  opportunities	  it	  would	  bring	  to	  Myanmar	  and	  the	  regions	  through	  which	  it	  passes.	  	  Myanmar’s	  political	  transition	  (2011-­‐present)	  allowed	  new	  actors	  with	  different	  to	  contest	  the	  pipelines	  meaning.	  Social	  movements,	  pro-­‐democracy	  news	  outlets	  and	  opposition	  political	  parties	  were	  able	  to	  assign	  new	  ideas	  to	  the	  project	  and	  embed	  it	  in	  national	  discussions	  about	  accountability,	  social	  and	  environmental	  norms	  and	  Chinese	  exploitation	  of	  Myanmar’s	  resources.	  	  5.1.1	  A	  rentier	  culture	  The	  social	  structures	  and	  beliefs	  that	  constituted	  Myanmar’s	  energy	  culture	  under	  the	  military	  junta	  are	  important	  for	  understanding	  why	  the	  pipelines	  were	  built.	  Organizationally,	  Myanmar’s	  decision-­‐making	  structure	  around	  energy	  was	  highly	  centralized.	  Andrew	  Selth,	  an	  analyst	  of	  Myanmar’s	  military	  affairs,	  described	  an	  ‘opaqueness’	  that	  extends	  ‘to	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  government,	  where	  many	  important	  issues	  seem	  to	  be	  decided	  by	  individuals,	  notably	  regime	  leader	  Senior	  General	  Than	  Shwe’.	  110	  Identifying	  the	  beliefs	  of	  senior	  leadership	  around	  energy	  that	  led	  to	  the	  pipeline	  project	  is	  therefore	  difficult	  but	  a	  number	  of	  conclusions	  can	  be	  made.	  	  Myanmar’s	  junta	  saw	  energy	  resources	  primarily	  as	  a	  source	  of	  export	  earnings	  to	  be	  used	  by	  the	  central	  government	  in	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  union,	  large	  infrastructure	  projects	  were	  seen	  as	  an	  important	  signifier	  of	  progress,	  China	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  favorable	  economic	  and	  political	  partner	  and	  	  here	  was	  a	  conscious	  disregard	  for	  the	  social	  and	  environmental	  impacts	  of	  projects,	  especially	  in	  areas	  populated	  by	  ethnic	  minorities.	  	  5.1.1.1	  Export	  earnings	  for	  the	  central	  government	  	  Between	  the	  early	  1990s	  and	  2011	  Myanmar	  had	  what	  can	  be	  described	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  Benedict	  Rogers	  and	  Jeremy	  Woodrum,	  Than	  Shwe:	  Unmasking	  Burma's	  
Tyrant	  (Seatle	  University	  of	  Washington	  Press	  2009).	  
52	  
a	  rentier	  energy	  culture.	  The	  export	  of	  natural	  gas,	  oil	  and	  electricity	  has	  been	  a	  key	  source	  of	  export	  earnings	  for	  the	  military	  junta,	  which	  would	  have	  otherwise	  been	  crippled,	  and	  existentially	  threatened,	  by	  Western	  sanctions.	  	  Burma	  gained	  independence	  in	  1948	  and	  after	  the	  coup	  de	  tat	  of	  1962	  foreign	  oil	  assets	  were	  taken	  over	  as	  part	  of	  the	  ‘Burmese	  way	  to	  socialism’	  doctrine	  of	  Ne	  Win’s	  revolutionary	  council.	  The	  ideological	  framework	  of	  the	  Burmese	  way	  to	  socialism	  has	  been	  described	  as	  ‘a	  peculiar	  mix	  of	  Marxism,	  nationalism,	  and	  Buddhism,	  grounded	  in	  an	  intolerance	  of	  dissent	  and	  an	  extreme	  xenophobia’.111	  Central	  planning	  and	  control	  of	  key	  assets	  was	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  the	  philosophy	  and	  in	  1963	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  British	  owned	  Burmah	  Oil	  Company	  were	  nationalized	  and	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  state	  monopoly	  People’s	  Oil	  Industry,	  renamed	  the	  Burma	  Oil	  Corporation	  in	  1970	  and	  the	  Myanmar	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Enterprise	  in	  1989.	  	  Foreign	  investors	  were	  allowed	  back	  into	  Myanmar’s	  oil	  and	  gas	  sector	  after	  the	  State	  Law	  and	  Order	  Restoration	  Council	  (SLORC)	  introduced	  the	  Union	  of	  Myanmar	  Foreign	  Investment	  Law	  in	  November	  1988,	  which	  guaranteed	  that	  foreign	  businesses	  would	  not	  be	  nationalized.	  The	  government	  then	  encouraged	  foreign	  firms	  to	  conduct	  oil	  exploration	  in	  Myanmar	  and	  contract	  for	  exploration	  and	  drilling	  were	  signed	  with	  international	  firms.	  	  Despite	  the	  foreign	  investment	  law,	  the	  government	  continues	  to	  legally	  control	  all	  natural	  resources.	  The	  State-­‐Owned	  Enterprises	  Law	  of	  1989	  gives	  ‘sole	  right’	  to	  the	  government	  for	  ‘the	  exploration,	  extraction,	  production	  and	  sale	  of	  petroleum	  and	  natural	  gas’.	  Similarly,	  the	  2008	  constitution	  of	  Myanmar	  states	  that	  the	  Union	  is:	  ‘the	  ultimate	  owner	  of	  all	  lands	  and	  natural	  resources	  above	  and	  below	  the	  ground,	  above	  and	  beneath	  the	  water	  and	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  of	  the	  Union.’	  Rules	  such	  as	  this	  are	  important	  indicator	  of	  beliefs	  because	  they	  are	  a	  formal	  embodiment	  of	  ideational	  structures.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  Myanmar’s	  energy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  Ibid.	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culture	  that	  can	  be	  located	  in	  the	  ideological	  framework	  of	  the	  ‘Burmese	  way	  to	  socialism.’	  In	  the	  early	  1990s	  the	  brutal	  repression	  of	  a	  pro-­‐democracy	  movement	  by	  the	  military	  led	  to	  the	  enactment	  of	  sanctions	  by	  Western	  countries	  and	  the	  supply	  of	  oil	  and	  gas	  became	  a	  critical	  source	  of	  revenue	  for	  the	  military	  government.	  Myanmar	  invited	  foreign	  firms	  to	  begin	  offshore	  exploration	  and	  production	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  and	  large	  discoveries	  were	  made	  in	  the	  Yadana	  field	  by	  French	  firm	  Total	  and	  in	  the	  Yetagun	  field	  by	  Texaco/Premier.	  Natural	  gas	  became	  the	  top	  export	  item	  in	  2001,	  accounting	  for	  approximately	  40%	  of	  total	  exports	  for	  the	  decade	  that	  followed.112	  The	  most	  significant	  of	  these	  sources	  have	  been	  the	  Yadana,	  and	  Yedagun	  fields	  that	  supply	  natural	  gas	  to	  Thailand	  through	  a	  670km	  pipeline.	  In	  the	  early	  2000s	  there	  were	  more	  large	  finds	  by	  Korean	  firm	  Daewoo	  in	  the	  Shwe	  Gas	  field	  (gas	  for	  China-­‐Myanmar	  pipeline)	  and	  by	  Thailand’s	  PTT	  in	  the	  Zawtika	  field.	  Myanmar’s	  junta	  saw	  their	  primary	  responsibility	  as	  maintaining	  the	  territorial	  integrity	  of	  the	  nation	  from	  foreign	  threats	  and	  the	  domestic	  civil	  conflicts	  with	  more	  than	  twenty	  armed	  ethnic	  groups.	  Energy	  exports	  were	  used	  primarily	  for	  resources	  in	  that	  cause.	  According	  to	  individuals	  who	  knew	  Senior	  General	  Than	  Shwe,	  nearly	  every	  speech	  that	  he	  gave	  was	  ‘deeply	  infused	  with	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  maintaining	  the	  territorial	  integrity	  of	  the	  nation’.113	  	  Moreover,	  research	  by	  NGOs	  has	  shown	  correlations	  between	  the	  Yadana	  natural	  gas	  field	  becoming	  operational	  and	  large	  arms	  acquisitions.114	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  export	  of	  energy	  resources	  was	  primarily	  seen	  by	  the	  junta	  as	  a	  way	  to	  bolster	  the	  capabilities	  of	  the	  military.	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  although	  Myanmar	  is	  an	  important	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  Thet	  Aung	  Lynn	  and	  Mari	  Oye,	  "Natural	  Resources	  and	  Subnational	  Governance	  in	  Myanmar	  "	  in	  Subnational	  Governance	  in	  Myanmar	  
Discussion	  Paper	  Series	  (Asia	  Foundation,	  2014	  ),	  22.	  113Woodrum,	  Than	  Shwe:	  Unmasking	  Burma's	  Tyrant	  65.	  114	  Movement,	  "Corridor	  of	  Power,"	  13.	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regional	  supplier	  of	  natural	  gas,	  the	  country	  does	  not	  have	  large	  reserves	  by	  international	  standards.	  In	  2010	  Myanmar	  had	  the	  proven	  natural	  gas	  reserves	  of	  283	  billion	  cubic	  meters	  ranking	  it	  40th	  in	  size	  internationally	  with	  approximately	  0.2%	  of	  the	  world	  total.	  	  Myanmar	  ranks	  behind	  other	  regional	  players	  such	  as	  Thailand	  (39th	  with	  284	  bcm)	  Brunei	  (34th	  with	  390	  bcm)	  Vietnam	  (29th	  with	  699	  bcm)	  and	  Malaysia	  (15th	  with	  2350	  bcm).	  Myanmar	  has	  become	  an	  important	  producer,	  despite	  relatively	  modest	  reserves,	  because	  of	  successive	  government’s	  preference	  for	  using	  the	  resources	  as	  a	  source	  of	  export	  revenue	  and	  foreign	  currency	  instead	  of	  supplying	  local	  demand.	  In	  2014	  approximately	  80%	  of	  natural	  gas	  produced	  in	  Myanmar	  was	  exported.115	  What	  this	  indicates	  is	  that	  there	  is	  that	  government	  preference,	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes	  toward	  energy,	  have	  driven	  exports	  rather	  than	  just	  the	  material	  reality	  of	  the	  country’s	  resource	  endowment.	  	  	  5.1.1.2	  Infrastructure	  projects	  as	  a	  signifier	  of	  progress	  The	  military	  junta,	  and	  Senior	  General	  Than	  Shwe	  in	  particular,	  viewed	  large-­‐scale	  energy	  projects	  as	  an	  important	  signifier	  of	  progress	  and	  economic	  development.	  While	  many	  aspects	  of	  development,	  such	  as	  education	  and	  healthcare,	  were	  completely	  neglected,	  large	  infrastructure	  projects	  like	  dams	  and	  highways	  were	  a	  priority.	  Than	  Shwe	  maintained	  a	  tight	  grip	  on	  economic	  policy,	  once	  purging	  another	  general	  for	  suggesting	  an	  alternate	  economic	  vision,116	  and	  from	  his	  position	  as	  chair	  of	  the	  Special	  Projects	  Implementation	  Committee	  he	  personally	  drove	  and	  oversaw	  infrastructure	  projects.	  	  In	  one	  of	  his	  only	  interviews	  with	  foreign	  media,	  Than	  Shwe	  recounted	  his	  government’s	  success	  in	  building	  dams	  claiming	  that	  ‘up	  until	  1988,	  the	  country	  had	  only	  138	  dams…we	  have	  built	  233	  new	  dams	  and	  sluice	  gates,	  set	  up	  327	  river	  water	  pumping	  stations	  in	  areas	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  build	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  William	  Boot,	  "Burma	  Won't	  Export	  New	  Gas	  Finds	  until	  Domestic	  Needs	  Met,	  Says	  Official,"	  The	  Irrawaddy,	  February	  7	  2014.	  116	  Woodrum,	  Than	  Shwe:	  Unmasking	  Burma's	  Tyrant	  217.
55	  
dams	  in’.117	  The	  General’s	  passion	  for	  such	  projects	  was	  also	  noted	  by	  a	  former	  British	  Ambassador	  that	  had	  interacted	  with	  him:	  ‘he	  is	  very	  proud	  of	  having	  unified	  the	  country,	  in	  his	  view,	  and	  having	  made	  it	  stable,	  and	  he	  is	  very	  proud	  of	  all	  the	  bridges	  and	  roads	  and	  dams’.	  He	  pointed	  out	  that	  ‘There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  they	  think	  this	  is	  a	  big	  deal	  –	  but	  you	  wonder	  about	  the	  software.	  They	  haven’t	  done	  anything	  there;	  in	  fact	  they	  have	  let	  it	  wither’.118	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  junta,	  and	  Than	  Shwe,	  do	  feel	  some	  responsibility	  for	  economic	  development	  and	  they	  see	  infrastructure	  projects	  as	  a	  way	  to	  pursue	  it	  and	  demonstrate	  it	  to	  the	  world.	  	  5.1.1.3	  Disregard	  for	  social	  and	  environmental	  impacts	  Another	  dimension	  of	  the	  junta’s	  rentier	  energy	  culture	  has	  been	  a	  total	  disregard	  for	  the	  social	  and	  environmental	  impacts	  of	  foreign	  energy	  projects	  within	  Myanmar.	  	  According	  to	  Adam	  Simpson	  ‘In	  general,	  environmental	  governance	  of	  large	  projects	  of	  governments	  and	  their	  agencies	  in	  the	  South	  is	  poorly	  executed,	  but	  projects	  involving	  Myanmar	  have	  been	  particularly	  notable	  for	  environmental	  destruction	  and	  human	  rights	  abuses’.119	  	  This	  is	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  of	  the	  countries	  natural	  resource	  endowments	  are	  located	  in	  areas	  populated	  by	  ethnic	  minorities	  where	  the	  government	  is	  was/is	  fighting	  against	  armed	  ethnic	  groups.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  military	  to	  ensure	  the	  security	  of	  the	  projects	  has	  brought	  immense	  suffering	  to	  communities	  in	  the	  vicinity.	  	  An	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  military	  junta’s	  philosophy	  was	  the	  principle	  of	  ‘Amyo,	  Batha,	  Thathana’.	  It	  translates	  as	  ‘One	  race,	  one	  language,	  one	  religion’.120	  The	  result	  of	  this	  philosophy	  is	  that	  people	  from	  ethnic	  minority	  communities	  are	  treated	  as	  second-­‐class	  citizens	  by	  the	  majorty	  ethnic	  Burmese	  military	  and	  large	  infrastructure	  projects	  have	  taken	  place	  against	  this	  backdrop.	  	  A	  particularly	  harrowing	  example	  was	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Yadana	  pipeline,	  through	  Mon	  state	  in	  Southern	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  Senior	  General	  Than	  Shwe,	  June	  2011.	  118	  Woodrum,	  Than	  Shwe:	  Unmasking	  Burma's	  Tyrant	  173.	  119	  Simpson,	  "Civil	  Society	  and	  Pipeline	  Politics	  in	  Myanmar(Burma):	  Energy	  Markets	  and	  Activist	  Environmental	  Governance	  "	  5.	  120	  Ibid.	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Myanmar,	  which	  led	  to	  systemic	  human	  rights	  abuses	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  military	  and	  environmental	  destruction.	  Field	  research	  by	  Earthrights	  International	  detailed	  cases	  of	  summary	  executions,	  torture,	  rape,	  forced	  labour	  and	  forced	  relocations.121	  As	  well	  as	  a	  disregard	  for	  communities	  there	  has	  also	  been	  an	  institutional	  incapacity	  for	  implementation,	  monitoring	  and	  enforcement	  of	  social	  and	  environmental	  standards.	  According	  to	  a	  senior	  staff	  member	  from	  and	  oil	  and	  gas	  company	  with	  a	  contract	  in	  Myanmar,	  the	  low	  level	  of	  social	  and	  environmental	  regulations	  in	  Myanmar	  means	  that	  the	  industry	  has	  been	  effectively	  self-­‐regulated.122	  The	  result	  has	  been	  that	  businesses	  who	  are	  accountable	  to	  shareholders,	  more	  often	  Western	  businesses,	  have	  tended	  to	  pursue	  greater	  corporate	  social	  responsibility	  while	  less	  accountable	  entities	  such	  as	  national	  oil	  companies	  have	  not.	  This	  rentier	  culture	  began	  to	  change	  after	  the	  2011	  political	  transition.	  	  5.1.2	  Brief	  overview	  of	  political	  transition	  	  Myanmar	  was	  ruled	  by	  various	  iterations	  of	  military	  dictatorship	  from	  1962	  to	  2011.	  A	  constitution	  adopted	  in	  2008	  led	  to	  an	  election	  in	  2010,	  widely	  considered	  fraudulent,	  that	  brought	  the	  military-­‐backed	  Union	  Solidarity	  and	  Development	  Party	  (USDP)	  to	  power	  in	  March	  2011.	  The	  new	  government	  under	  ex-­‐general	  Thein	  Sein	  embarked	  on	  a	  number	  of	  significant	  reforms	  including	  new	  labour	  legislation,	  release	  of	  political	  prisoners	  and	  the	  ending	  of	  press	  censorship.	  The	  political	  reform	  process	  has	  been	  incrementally	  implemented	  from	  the	  top-­‐down	  and	  the	  2008	  constitution	  reserves	  25%	  of	  the	  seats	  in	  each	  house	  of	  the	  bicameral	  legislature	  for	  the	  military.	  	  Human	  rights	  abuses	  continue	  especially	  in	  those	  areas	  populated	  by	  ethnic	  minorities	  and	  those	  occupied	  by	  the	  Tatmadaw	  (army).	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  Earthrights	  International,	  "Total	  Denial	  "(Earthrights	  International	  1996	  ).	  122	  Senior	  staff	  member	  at	  an	  oil	  and	  gas	  company	  in	  Myanmar,	  interview	  by	  Jeremy	  Todd,	  12	  December	  2014,	  Yangon.	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Thus	  there	  are	  aspects	  of	  both	  continuity	  and	  change	  from	  the	  previous	  regime.	  Robert	  Taylor	  summarizes	  that	  ‘the	  new	  constitutional	  order….	  preserved	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  while	  creating	  an	  arena	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  civilian	  political	  interests	  and	  activities’.123	  The	  pace	  and	  level	  of	  change	  has	  varied	  greatly	  depending	  on	  the	  issue,	  the	  political	  climate	  and	  the	  part	  of	  the	  country.	  	  This	  had	  a	  strong	  impact	  on	  Myanmar’s	  energy	  culture.	  New	  actors	  have	  emerged,	  the	  government	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  accountable	  and	  new	  norms	  are	  guiding	  the	  actions	  of	  policy-­‐makers.	  	  5.1.3	  Changing	  culture:	  addressing	  domestic	  energy	  demand	  	  One	  significant	  change	  has	  been	  that	  the	  new	  nominally	  civilian	  government	  has	  begun	  to	  focus	  on	  supplying	  the	  domestic	  market.	  This	  reflects	  new	  norms	  about	  local	  ownership	  of	  resources.	  Signals	  of	  a	  change	  in	  approach	  began	  to	  emerge	  in	  2012	  ahead	  of	  a	  number	  of	  rounds	  of	  bidding	  for	  on	  and	  offshore	  blocks.	  In	  his	  first	  interview	  with	  foreign	  media,	  the	  Myanmar	  Minister	  of	  Energy	  Than	  Htay	  said	  that	  ‘power	  is	  very	  much	  crucial	  to	  our	  transformation	  process…we	  are	  developing,	  we	  need	  more	  energy,	  so	  we	  won’t	  sell	  our	  natural	  gas	  abroad.	  We	  will	  use	  it	  ourselves.’	  He	  explained	  there	  was	  a	  ‘huge	  gap	  between	  supply	  and	  demand’	  but	  assured	  that	  existing	  contracts	  with	  China	  and	  Thailand	  would	  be	  honored.124	  This	  marks	  a	  considerable	  departure	  from	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  junta,	  which	  placed	  little	  importance	  on	  supplying	  the	  energy	  needs	  of	  the	  population.	  But	  despite	  assurances	  that	  contracts	  would	  be	  honored,	  the	  CEO	  of	  Thailand’s	  oil	  company	  PTT	  Palin	  Chuchottaworn	  revealed	  to	  Reuters	  in	  2013	  that	  ‘we’re	  renegotiating	  [the	  contract]	  already’.125	  Because	  renegotiation	  is	  often	  a	  cause	  of	  disputes,	  and	  this	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  new	  government	  is	  willing	  to	  renegotiate	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  Robert	  H.	  Taylor,	  "Myanmar:	  From	  Army	  Rule	  to	  Constitutional	  Rule?,"	  
Asian	  Affairs	  63,	  no.	  11	  (2012):	  4.	  124	  Jason	  Szep,	  "Myanmar	  Has	  No	  Plans	  to	  Export	  New	  Gas	  Finds	  "	  Reuters	  27	  January	  2012.	  125	  Wayne	  Arnold,	  "Myanmar	  Finally	  Takes	  a	  Seat	  at	  Its	  Own	  Oil	  &	  Gas	  Feast,"	  ibid.,	  June	  12	  2013.	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contracts,	  this	  indicates	  that	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  dispute	  has	  heightened	  over	  the	  Myanmar-­‐China	  pipelines	  due	  to	  new	  norms	  about	  the	  use	  of	  resources.	  	  5.1.4	  Changing	  culture:	  new	  social	  and	  environmental	  norms	  	  The	  government	  has	  also	  taken	  a	  number	  of	  significant	  actions	  that	  indicate	  that	  they	  are	  taking	  the	  social	  and	  environmental	  impacts	  of	  large	  energy	  projects	  seriously.	  The	  most	  symbolic	  was	  the	  decision	  to	  suspend	  the	  $3.6b	  Chinese-­‐led	  Myitsone	  Dam126	  project	  only	  months	  after	  coming	  to	  power	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  ‘will	  of	  the	  people’.	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  decision	  to	  suspend	  the	  Dawei	  coal	  power	  plant,	  which	  would	  have	  sent	  100%	  of	  electricity	  generated	  to	  Thailand.	  In	  a	  statement	  addressing	  public	  criticism	  one	  of	  the	  energy	  ministers,	  Khin	  Maung	  Soe,	  told	  reporters	  that	  the	  government	  had	  decided	  to	  stop	  the	  coal	  plant	  ‘after	  reading	  about	  concerns	  over	  the	  environmental	  impact	  of	  this	  plant	  in	  local	  media	  reports’.127	  The	  fact	  that	  environmental	  impacts	  were	  cited	  shows	  that	  the	  government	  is	  responding	  to	  political	  pressure	  and	  is	  being	  held	  to	  new	  standards	  of	  appropriate	  behavior.	  	  New	  standards	  have	  also	  been	  implemented	  requiring	  social	  and	  environmental	  impact	  assessments	  for	  large	  projects.	  In	  2012	  the	  new	  government	  passed	  the	  Environmental	  Conservation	  Law	  requiring	  both	  environmental	  and	  social	  impact	  assessments	  for	  the	  extractive	  industries,	  which	  must	  involve	  consultation	  with	  communities	  affected	  by	  such	  projects.	  The	  government	  has	  also	  signed	  up	  to	  the	  Extractive	  Industries	  Transparency	  Initiative	  (EITI),	  a	  global	  standard	  to	  promote	  openness	  and	  accountability	  in	  the	  management	  of	  natural	  resources.	  Membership	  of	  the	  EITI	  has	  stringent	  reporting	  requirements	  on	  revenues	  and	  taxation	  and	  requires	  governments	  and	  businesses	  to	  work	  with	  civil	  society	  to	  promote	  transparency.	  Myanmar’s	  ascendency	  to	  the	  EITI	  has	  been	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  The	  pipelines,	  the	  Myitsone	  Dam	  and	  the	  Letpandaung	  copper	  mine	  are	  the	  three	  major	  Chinese	  projects	  in	  Myanmar.	  The	  new	  Myanmar	  government	  also	  renegotiated	  the	  contract	  of	  the	  Letpandaung	  copper	  mine	  in	  Myanmar’s	  favour.	  	  	  127	  Gwen	  Robinson,	  "Myanmar	  Cancels	  Big	  Power	  Plant	  Project,"	  Financial	  
Times	  January	  10	  2012.	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major	  political	  issue	  because	  it	  requires	  the	  government	  to	  work	  alongside	  non-­‐governmental	  and	  community	  organisations	  through	  major	  projects	  and	  reveal	  where	  revenues	  from	  major	  projects	  are	  being	  directed.	  This	  acknowledges	  the	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  a	  formal	  sense	  and	  illustrates	  the	  new	  social	  structures	  in	  Myanmar’s	  energy	  culture.	  The	  government	  announced	  its	  commitment	  to	  joining	  the	  initiative	  in	  2013,	  was	  accepted	  as	  a	  candidate	  country	  in	  2014	  and	  will	  have	  to	  submit	  its	  first	  report	  by	  2016.	  	  	  	  
5.2	  Reframing	  the	  pipeline	  	  	  	  	  Looking	  to	  the	  role	  of	  agency,	  this	  section	  will	  consider	  how	  activists	  have	  contested	  social	  understandings	  of	  the	  Myanmar-­‐China	  Pipeline.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  pipeline	  meanings	  are	  contestable	  and	  can	  be	  influenced	  by	  changing	  domestic	  social	  and	  political	  circumstances.	  Constructivist	  theorists	  have	  paid	  considerable	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  social	  movements	  and	  activists	  in	  changing	  social	  understandings.	  Scholars	  such	  as	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  (1998)	  and	  Risse	  et	  al	  (1999)	  have	  examined	  the	  sorts	  of	  techniques	  that	  activists	  use	  such	  as	  symbolic	  politics,	  issue	  framing	  and	  shaming.	  Using	  these	  speech	  acts	  the	  pipeline	  has	  been	  constructed	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  Chinese	  exploitation,	  rent-­‐seeking,	  social	  and	  environmental	  irresponsibility	  and	  marginalisation	  of	  ethnic	  minorities.	  Opposition	  political	  parties,	  non-­‐governmental	  groups,	  community	  level	  organisations	  and	  pro-­‐democracy	  news	  outlets	  have	  been	  important	  agents	  in	  this	  process.	  The	  narrative	  produced	  by	  the	  Myanmar	  government	  and	  the	  China-­‐National	  Petroleum	  Company	  in	  Myanmar	  primarily	  focused	  on	  the	  economic	  benefits	  of	  the	  pipeline	  to	  Myanmar	  and	  the	  underdeveloped	  areas	  along	  the	  pipeline	  route.	  According	  to	  Myanmar’s	  Vice	  President	  U	  Nyan	  Tun	  ‘this	  project	  will	  promote	  our	  country’s	  economy	  and	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development	  in	  the	  area	  the	  pipeline	  crosses’.128	  Thus	  the	  meaning	  assigned	  to	  the	  government	  primarily	  revolved	  around	  economic	  development	  and	  modernisation.	  This	  meaning	  was	  reproduced	  through	  media	  outlets	  such	  as	  television	  and	  newspapers	  like	  The	  New	  Light	  of	  
Myanmar,	  which	  are	  widely	  viewed	  and	  read.	  	  As	  Myanmar’s	  political	  change	  progressed,	  a	  variety	  of	  political	  actors	  were	  able	  to	  contest	  this	  and	  assign	  new	  meanings	  to	  the	  pipeline.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  groups	  was	  activists.	  Adam	  Simpson	  argues	  that	  ‘activists	  can	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  communicating	  local	  community	  concerns	  to	  these	  bodies	  and	  their	  governments	  but	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  influence	  depends	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  political	  regimes	  under	  which	  they	  operate’.129	  The	  military	  regime	  had	  previously	  prohibited	  and	  brutally	  punished	  any	  sort	  of	  dissent	  so	  social	  movements	  were	  limited	  in	  their	  abilities	  as	  agents	  of	  socialisation.	  According	  to	  a	  former	  political	  exile	  who	  returned	  to	  Myanmar	  to	  work	  on	  the	  pipeline	  project,	  if	  you	  spoke	  out	  about	  the	  human	  rights	  impacts	  of	  the	  China-­‐Myanmar	  pipeline	  in	  2009,	  you	  could	  be	  arrested.130	  For	  that	  reason	  many	  of	  the	  activists	  working	  on	  the	  China-­‐Myanmar	  pipeline	  were	  political	  exiles	  primarily	  based	  in	  Thailand.	  While	  they	  were	  able	  to	  bring	  international	  attention	  to	  the	  issues,	  they	  were	  less	  able	  to	  perform	  research	  or	  advocacy	  roles.	  This	  began	  to	  change	  after	  the	  2011	  election.	  On	  the	  17th	  of	  August	  2011	  newly	  elected	  President	  Thein	  Sein	  invited	  Myanmar’s	  political	  exiles	  to	  return	  home.	  An	  estimated	  one	  million	  had	  fled	  for	  political	  reasons,	  most	  since	  the	  brutal	  crackdowns	  in	  1988	  and	  a	  large	  number	  continued	  their	  activism	  overseas	  with	  large	  concentrations	  in	  Thai	  cities	  of	  Chiang	  Mai	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  Aung	  Shin,	  "$1	  Billion	  Local	  Investment	  in	  Pipeline	  "	  Myanmar	  Times	  2	  February	  2015.	  129	  Simpson,	  "Civil	  Society	  and	  Pipeline	  Politics	  in	  Myanmar(Burma):	  Energy	  Markets	  and	  Activist	  Environmental	  Governance	  "	  4.	  130	  Human	  rights	  activist,	  interview	  by	  Jeremy	  Todd,	  7	  December	  2014,	  Yangon.	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and	  Mae	  Sot.131	  In	  the	  same	  month	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Information	  lifted	  the	  requirement	  that	  news	  outlets	  submit	  materials	  to	  the	  government	  prior	  to	  publication,	  effectively	  ending	  Myanmar’s	  decades	  of	  press	  censorship	  and	  allowing	  pro-­‐democracy	  news	  outlets	  such	  as	  The	  Irrawaddy	  and	  the	  
Democratic	  Voice	  of	  Burma	  to	  set	  up	  offices	  within	  Myanmar.	  While	  activists	  continued	  to	  be	  harassed	  and	  arrested,	  especially	  for	  protest	  action,	  these	  changes	  created	  a	  political	  space	  within	  Myanmar	  for	  civil	  society	  to	  operate	  and	  contest	  norms	  around	  energy	  and	  foreign	  investment.	  	  5.2.1	  Organisation	  The	  organisational	  structures	  of	  the	  main	  civil	  society	  groups	  allowed	  a	  broad	  number	  of	  disparate	  groups	  and	  individuals,	  across	  large	  geographical,	  cultural	  and	  linguistic	  barriers	  to	  communicate	  a	  shared	  message	  and	  approach	  on	  the	  pipeline	  issue.	  This	  was	  an	  important	  aspect	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  contest	  understandings.	  Two	  key	  coalitions	  were	  the	  Shwe	  Gas	  Movement	  and	  The	  Myanmar-­‐China	  Pipeline	  Watch	  Committee.	  The	  actors	  involved	  have	  a	  range	  of	  social,	  political	  and	  ethnic	  identities	  but	  they	  were	  brought	  together	  but	  a	  number	  of	  common	  characteristics.	  One	  was	  that	  most	  came	  from	  an	  ethnic	  minority	  area	  affected	  by	  the	  pipeline.	  Another	  was	  the	  common	  experience	  of	  exile	  in	  countries	  like	  Thailand	  and	  Bangladesh	  where	  pro-­‐democracy	  (or	  anti-­‐government)	  groups	  coalesced	  alongside	  international	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  (NGOs)	  working	  on	  social	  and	  environmental	  causes.	  The	  shared	  experience	  and	  familiarity	  created	  by	  political	  exile	  was	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  work	  together	  on	  the	  pipeline	  issue	  and	  these	  groups	  gained	  education	  and	  skills	  from	  the	  support	  of	  international	  NGOs.132	  	  This	  shared	  experience	  of	  exile	  can	  be	  considered	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  identity	  formation	  of	  these	  individuals.	  Common	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes	  to	  the	  groups	  include	  pro-­‐democracy	  sympathies,	  pro-­‐self	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  Nyein	  Nyein,	  "Burma's	  Exiles	  Want	  Clear	  Rules	  for	  Return,"	  The	  
Irrawaddy,	  2	  December	  2014.	  132Interview	  with	  activist,	  "Human	  Rights	  China-­‐Myanmar	  Pipeline."	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determination	  for	  ethnic	  minorities	  and	  local	  ownership	  of	  resources.	  	  The	  Shwe	  Gas	  Movement	  (SGM)	  is	  a	  collection	  of	  individuals	  and	  smaller	  groups	  primarily	  from	  Western	  Myanmar’s	  Rakhine	  (Arakan)	  State,	  which	  came	  together	  in	  2002	  when	  exploration	  began	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Rakhine	  State.	  	  Key	  players	  are	  the	  Global	  Coordinator	  Wong	  Aung,	  Arakan	  Oil	  Watch	  and	  the	  All	  Arakan	  Students	  and	  Youth	  Congress.	  The	  group	  was	  originally	  based	  in	  Chiang	  Mai,	  Thailand	  where	  it	  was	  supported	  by	  international	  NGOs	  and	  members	  have	  experience	  campaigning	  on	  and	  researching	  other	  energy	  projects	  such	  as	  the	  Yadana	  Pipeline	  in	  the	  1990s.133	  Stated	  aims	  of	  the	  Shwe	  Gas	  Movement	  are	  ‘raising	  awareness	  about	  the	  social,	  economic	  and	  environmental	  impacts	  of	  the	  Shwe	  Gas	  Project’134	  and	  a	  central	  message	  is	  Rakhine	  ownership	  of	  Shwe	  gas.	  	  	  The	  Myanmar-­‐China	  Pipeline	  Committee	  began	  in	  2012	  and	  consists	  of	  18	  groups	  across	  the	  pipeline	  route	  from	  Shwe	  Gas	  Movement	  and	  other	  Rakhine	  groups	  to	  Shan	  and	  Palaung	  groups	  based	  in	  Lashio	  near	  the	  Chinese	  border.	  	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  group	  has	  to	  present	  a	  united	  front	  among	  the	  different	  affected	  communities	  and	  to	  produce	  research	  on	  social	  and	  environmental	  impacts.135	  This	  group	  also	  consists	  of	  community	  level	  groups	  as	  well	  as	  issue-­‐specific	  social	  movements.	  	  5.2.2	  Collecting	  information	  One	  key	  function	  of	  these	  groups	  was	  the	  collection	  of	  information	  about	  the	  pipelines	  numerous	  social	  and	  environmental	  impacts.	  The	  collection	  of	  this	  data	  also	  allowed	  civil	  society	  groups	  to	  challenge	  claims	  from	  the	  government	  and	  oil	  companies	  about	  the	  benefits	  that	  the	  pipeline	  would	  bring	  to	  regional	  areas	  such	  as	  training,	  business	  opportunities	  and	  employment.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Simpson,	  "Civil	  Society	  and	  Pipeline	  Politics	  in	  Myanmar(Burma):	  Energy	  Markets	  and	  Activist	  Environmental	  Governance	  "	  11.	  134	  Shwe	  Gas	  Movement,	  "About,	  Shwe	  Gas	  Movement	  Website	  "	  	  www.shwe.org.	  135	  Interview	  with	  Community	  Group	  Member,	  "Myanmar-­‐China	  Pipeline	  and	  Human	  Rights."	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In	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  pipelines	  construction	  research	  was	  extremely	  difficult.	  In	  Shan	  State	  where	  the	  military	  was	  fighting	  groups	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  the	  pipeline	  route	  such	  as	  the	  Ta’ang	  National	  Liberation	  Army	  and	  the	  Northern	  Shan	  Army	  the	  roads	  were	  controlled	  by	  the	  military	  and	  researchers	  were	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  arrested,	  and	  beaten	  under	  the	  pretext	  of	  aiding	  the	  rebels.136	  While	  some	  information	  was	  being	  reported,	  this	  largely	  suppressed	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  social	  understandings	  of	  the	  pipelines	  until	  Myanmar’s	  political	  atmosphere	  began	  to	  shift.	  	  	  In	  conducting	  field	  research	  for	  a	  report	  on	  the	  impacts	  of	  the	  pipeline	  in	  2011	  one	  community	  group	  member	  described	  his	  process	  of	  field	  research.	  He	  explained	  that	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  under	  the	  radar	  of	  the	  military	  and	  to	  gain	  the	  trust	  of	  the	  villagers	  who	  were	  terrified	  of	  discussing	  politics	  ‘We	  had	  to	  pretend	  to	  be	  villagers	  looking	  for	  work	  and	  stay	  in	  the	  area	  for	  a	  week	  or	  ten	  days.	  We	  told	  the	  villagers	  we	  were	  looking	  for	  a	  job.	  People	  would	  not	  talk	  because	  they	  were	  afraid	  and	  we	  had	  to	  build	  trust’.137	  Twenty	  members	  of	  his	  organisation	  used	  this	  strategy	  to	  survey	  the	  impacts	  of	  the	  pipeline	  in	  52	  villages.	  The	  changing	  political	  climate	  allowed	  field	  research	  to	  be	  conducted	  more	  safely	  and	  thoroughly	  and	  research	  was	  conducted	  by	  Earthrights	  International,	  the	  Myanmar-­‐China	  Pipeline	  Watch	  Committee,	  the	  Ta’ang	  Student	  and	  Youth	  Organisation,	  the	  Shwe	  Gas	  Movement,	  Arakan	  Oil	  Watch,	  the	  Northern	  Shan	  Farmers	  Committee,	  BadeiDha	  Moe	  Civil	  Society	  Organisation	  and	  The	  Myanmar	  Centre	  for	  Responsible	  Business	  as	  part	  of	  their	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Sector	  Wide	  Impact	  Assessment.138	  5.2.3	  Disseminating	  information	  This	  research	  has	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  number	  of	  reports	  by	  the	  aforementioned	  group	  that	  have	  been	  widely	  disseminated	  and	  cited	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  136	  Human	  rights	  activist,	  interview	  by	  Jeremy	  Todd,	  22	  January,	  2014	  Lashio,	  Shan	  State,	  Myanmar	  	  137	  Ibid.;	  ibid.	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national	  and	  international	  media	  outlets.	  Some	  of	  the	  key	  reports	  include	  Supply	  and	  Command	  (Shwe	  Gas	  Movement	  2006),	  Corridor	  of	  Power	  (Shwe	  Gas	  Movement,	  2009)	  and	  Sold	  Out	  (Shwe	  Gas	  Movement,	  2011).	  	  These	  reports	  detailed	  environmental	  damage,	  human	  rights	  abuses	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  military	  including	  forced	  labour	  and	  sexual	  violence	  and	  the	  poorly	  executed	  land	  compensation	  scheme.	  They	  were	  able	  to	  show	  that	  many	  of	  the	  workers	  on	  the	  project	  had	  actually	  been	  brought	  in	  from	  China	  and	  that	  the	  schools	  and	  hospitals	  built	  by	  CNPC	  as	  part	  of	  the	  corporate	  social	  responsibility	  efforts	  were	  built	  in	  areas	  away	  from	  the	  pipeline	  route	  and	  were	  going	  unused.	  These	  reports	  were	  circulated	  internationally,	  with	  Wong	  Aung	  frequently	  being	  quoted	  in	  publications	  such	  as	  the	  New	  York	  Times.	  Access	  to	  the	  Shwe	  Gas	  Movement	  website	  in	  Myanmar	  became	  available	  in	  September	  2011	  after	  blocks	  were	  lifted	  on	  exile	  websites.	  	  Shwe	  Gas	  Movement	  and	  Arakan	  Oil	  Watch	  are	  particularly	  adept	  at	  using	  digital	  mediums	  to	  communicate	  their	  messages	  and	  were	  initially	  supported	  in	  developing	  web	  and	  IT	  capacities	  by	  international	  NGOs.139	  All	  of	  the	  reports	  and	  press	  releases	  are	  available	  on	  the	  Shwe	  Gas	  Movement	  website	  as	  well	  as	  photographs	  and	  YouTube	  videos.	  The	  Arakan	  Oil	  Watch	  also	  publishes	  a	  regular	  Shwe	  Gas	  Bulletin	  including	  regular	  updates	  on	  projects	  and	  campaigns.	  	  Technological,	  as	  well	  as	  political,	  change	  has	  thus	  been	  instrumental	  in	  allowing	  these	  groups	  to	  organize,	  report	  on	  incidents	  and	  disseminate	  information.	  A	  community	  group	  member	  in	  Northern	  Shan	  State	  explained	  that	  now	  that	  cellphones	  are	  widely	  available	  farmers	  could	  report	  incidents	  and	  someone	  from	  his	  organisation	  can	  drive	  out	  and	  meet	  with	  them	  and	  report	  back	  online	  to	  the	  wider	  network.140	  	  Other	  groups	  that	  do	  not	  have	  the	  same	  level	  of	  IT	  skills	  necessary	  to	  build	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139Simpson,	  "Civil	  Society	  and	  Pipeline	  Politics	  in	  Myanmar(Burma):	  Energy	  Markets	  and	  Activist	  Environmental	  Governance	  ".	  140	  Interview	  with	  Community	  Group	  Member,	  "Myanmar-­‐China	  Pipeline	  and	  Human	  Rights."	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maintain	  websites	  have	  been	  able	  to	  use	  social	  media	  to	  communicate	  information.	  The	  Myanmar-­‐China	  Pipeline	  Watch	  Committee	  is	  particularly	  active	  on	  Facebook	  posting	  photographs	  and	  videos	  sent	  in	  by	  villagers.	  	  These	  groups	  are	  also	  proficient	  in	  using	  traditional	  media	  in	  communicating	  their	  messages	  and	  the	  relaxation	  of	  press	  censorship	  has	  allowed	  them	  to	  hold	  press	  conferences	  and	  issue	  media	  releases	  to	  domestic	  news	  outlets.	  Pro-­‐democracy	  national	  news	  outlets	  such	  as	  the	  
Myanmar	  Times,	  The	  Irrawaddy	  and	  The	  Democratic	  Voice	  of	  Burma	  frequently	  publish	  articles	  on	  Myanmar-­‐China	  pipeline	  as	  well	  as	  regional	  newspapers	  such	  as	  the	  Shan	  Herald.	  All	  of	  these	  news	  outlets	  have	  websites	  are	  widely	  read	  internationally	  and	  are	  often	  cited	  in	  the	  reports	  of	  international	  news	  outlets.	  For	  example,	  a	  report	  by	  the	  widely	  read	  British	  newspaper	  the	  Guardian	  read:	  
The	  losers	  from	  this	  venture	  are	  the	  Burmese	  people	  and	  the	  environment.	  An	  extensive	  report	  by	  the	  Shwe	  Gas	  Movement	  (SGM),	  a	  Burmese	  community	  based	  human	  rights	  network,	  documented	  the	  destruction	  of	  local	  fishing	  and	  farming	  industries,	  including	  confiscation	  of	  thousands	  of	  acres	  of	  land	  to	  ‘clear	  areas	  for	  the	  pipeline	  and	  associated	  infrastructure’,	  from	  2010	  to	  2011.	  Tens	  of	  thousands	  have	  been	  left	  jobless,	  with	  little	  or	  no	  compensation	  or	  employment	  opportunities.141	  By	  publishing	  these	  types	  of	  articles	  the	  newspapers	  became	  important	  agents	  in	  this	  process	  of	  socialisation.	  They	  were	  influencing	  the	  reproduction	  of	  certain	  ideas	  through	  their	  actions	  and	  therefore	  helping	  to	  assign	  new	  meanings	  to	  the	  pipelines	  that	  disrupt	  official	  narratives.	  	  5.2.4	  Campaigning	  	  These	  groups	  have	  also	  used	  targeted	  campaigns	  to	  convey	  their	  messages	  about	  local	  ownership	  of	  resources	  and	  Chinese	  exploitation	  of	  Myanmar.	  Evident	  in	  these	  campaigns	  has	  been	  the	  sort	  of	  techniques	  described	  by	  Risse	  and	  Sikkink	  such	  as	  shaming	  and	  symbolic	  politics.	  On	  the	  first	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  Nafeez	  Ahmed,	  "The	  Dirty	  Fossil	  Fuel	  Secret	  Behind	  Burma's	  Democratic	  Fairytale	  "	  The	  Guardian	  26	  April	  2013.	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March	  2012	  the	  Shwe	  Gas	  Movement	  organized	  an	  international	  day	  of	  protest	  action	  involving	  demonstrations	  by	  130	  groups	  across	  20	  countries.	  Accompanying	  the	  protest	  was	  an	  open	  letter	  to	  President	  Thein	  Sein	  asking	  for	  the	  immediate	  postponement	  of	  the	  pipelines	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  government	  ‘should	  be	  meeting	  energy	  needs	  instead’	  and	  ‘protecting	  community	  rights	  to	  their	  lands	  and	  livelihoods’.142	  Campaigns	  would	  coordinate	  protest	  action,	  letter	  writing,	  signature	  collection	  and	  report	  releases	  to	  draw	  as	  much	  media	  attention	  to	  the	  messages	  as	  possible.	  5.2.5	  Issue	  linkage	  and	  symbolic	  politics	  	  The	  linkage	  of	  the	  pipeline	  issue	  to	  a	  broader	  national	  discussion	  about	  self-­‐determination	  and	  the	  right	  of	  regions	  to	  subnational	  resource	  governance	  has	  been	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  campaigns.	  In	  Shan	  State	  the	  member	  of	  Shan	  Assembly	  for	  Namtu,	  Nang	  Kahm	  Aye,	  has	  been	  particularly	  active	  on	  the	  pipeline	  issue	  and	  has	  frequently	  brought	  the	  issue	  up	  in	  the	  Shan	  Assembly.	  As	  well	  as	  discussing	  environmental	  and	  social	  impacts	  she	  has	  argued	  that	  5%	  of	  the	  pipelines	  earnings	  should	  be	  used	  to	  compensate	  losses	  incurred	  by	  locals.143	  Similarly,	  the	  Shwe	  Gas	  Movement	  has	  been	  campaigning	  for	  local	  ownership	  of	  gas	  resources	  Rakhine	  state,	  which	  has	  one	  of	  the	  lowest	  rates	  of	  energy	  access	  in	  Myanmar.	  In	  2012	  the	  group	  launched	  the	  ‘24	  Hours	  of	  Electricity	  Now’	  campaign	  that	  demanded	  24	  hours	  of	  electricity	  a	  day	  in	  Rakhine	  State	  before	  any	  gas	  was	  exported.144	  This	  campaign	  featured	  t-­‐shirts,	  bumper	  stickers	  and	  posters	  with	  the	  slogan	  ’24	  Hours	  of	  Electricity	  Now.	  We	  Have	  the	  Right	  to	  Use	  Our	  Gas’	  and	  events	  centered	  on	  the	  traditional	  Rakhine	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  "Open	  Letter	  to	  President	  Thein	  Sein:	  Postpone	  Destructive	  Chinese	  Pipelines	  in	  Burma,"	  Federation	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  https://www.fidh.org/International-­‐Federation-­‐for-­‐Human-­‐Rights/asia/burma/Open-­‐letter-­‐to-­‐President-­‐Thein.	  143	  Interview	  with	  activist,	  "Research	  on	  the	  China-­‐Myanmar	  Pipelines	  ".	  144	  Natural	  gas	  plants	  are	  one	  of	  the	  main	  ways	  electricity	  is	  generated	  in	  Myanmar	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Rahta-­‐Swe-­‐Bwe	  tug-­‐of-­‐war	  events.145	  This	  indicates	  the	  Rahkhine	  based	  activists	  were	  using	  these	  traditional	  symbols	  and	  signifiers	  of	  Rakhine	  identity	  to	  link	  the	  campaign	  to	  broader	  themes	  of	  subnational	  resource	  governance	  and	  self-­‐determination.	  	  Formal	  Rakhine	  political	  parties	  in	  the	  state	  and	  national	  legislatures	  supported	  the	  campaign.	  Oo	  Hla	  Sow	  from	  the	  Rakhine	  Nationalities	  Democratic	  Party	  (RNDP)	  argued	  in	  Parliament	  that	  20%	  of	  the	  gas	  allocated	  to	  Myanmar	  should	  be	  used	  in	  Rakhine	  State	  and	  the	  party	  set	  up	  a	  ‘24	  Hour	  Electricity	  Committee’	  to	  push	  for	  it.146	  Another	  central	  theme	  running	  through	  campaigning	  is	  Chinese	  exploitation	  of	  Myanmar’s	  natural	  resources.	  By	  emphasizing	  Chinese	  aspect	  of	  the	  pipelines	  the	  campaign	  has	  tapped	  into	  a	  broader	  current	  of	  anti-­‐Chinese	  sentiment	  in	  Myanmar.	  This	  is	  another	  example	  of	  issue	  linkage	  and	  symbolic	  politics.	  Historical	  anti-­‐Chinese	  sentiments	  have	  been	  inflamed	  by	  the	  practices	  of	  Chinese	  businesses	  in	  recent	  years	  and	  have	  been	  allowed	  to	  expand	  by	  the	  relaxation	  of	  press	  censorship.	  There	  is	  a	  long	  history	  of	  anti-­‐Chinese	  sentiment	  in	  Myanmar	  with	  major	  anti-­‐Chinese	  riots	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  during	  China’s	  attempt	  to	  export	  communism	  during	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution.	  According	  to	  Min	  Zin,	  who	  studied	  attitudes	  toward	  Chinese	  in	  popular	  culture,	  there	  has	  been	  an	  observable	  anti-­‐Chinese	  attitude	  in	  Myanmar	  since	  at	  least	  the	  mid	  1980s.147	  	  Protests	  against	  major	  Chinese	  extractives	  projects	  have	  taken	  on	  a	  distinct	  anti-­‐Chinese	  character	  with	  the	  most	  widely	  reported	  example	  being	  the	  banner	  which	  was	  hung	  over	  the	  Chinese	  Embassy	  in	  Yangon	  during	  protests	  over	  the	  Letpadaung	  copper	  mine	  in	  2012	  which	  read	  ‘This	  is	  our	  Country	  –	  Dracula	  China	  Get	  Out!’148	  A	  text	  message	  with	  a	  similar	  tone	  went	  viral	  in	  Myanmar	  in	  2012:	  ‘Chinese	  get	  out.	  We’re	  not	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  "Energy	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  Work,"	  The	  Myanmar	  Times,	  20	  August	  2012.	  146	  Simpson,	  "Civil	  Society	  and	  Pipeline	  Politics	  in	  Myanmar(Burma):	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  Steinberg,	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  Journal	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  "	  
BBC,	  24	  January	  2013	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afraid	  of	  you’.149	  Reports	  from	  the	  Shwe	  Gas	  Movement	  such	  as	  ‘Corridor	  of	  Power’	  have	  a	  strong	  focus	  on	  the	  China,	  its	  role	  in	  undermining	  democratic	  reforms	  in	  Myanmar	  and	  the	  geopolitics	  of	  the	  pipeline.	  On	  the	  Shwe	  Gas	  Movement	  website	  the	  four	  of	  the	  five	  articles	  on	  the	  banner	  have	  the	  word	  China	  in	  the	  title.	  	  This	  anti-­‐Chinese	  sentiment	  prevalent	  in	  the	  campaigning	  is	  particularly	  evident	  when	  compared	  to	  campaigning	  against	  the	  Yadana	  pipeline,	  which	  pumps	  gas	  to	  Thailand.	  There	  is	  very	  little	  focus	  on	  the	  ‘Thai’	  character	  of	  the	  Yadana	  pipeline	  in	  reports	  from	  NGOs	  such	  as	  Earth	  Rights	  International	  and	  the	  Mon	  Human	  Rights	  Foundation	  despite	  Thai	  companies	  being	  involved	  in	  the	  project	  and	  Thailand	  being	  the	  end	  consumer.	  The	  campaigning	  over	  the	  China-­‐Myanmar	  pipelines	  in	  comparison	  paints	  the	  pipeline	  as	  part	  of	  a	  major	  expansion	  of	  Chinese	  power	  and	  a	  purposeful	  exploitation	  of	  Myanmar’s	  resources.	  	  5.2.6	  Impact	  of	  social	  movements	  	  The	  impacts	  that	  these	  social	  movements	  have	  had	  on	  the	  pipelines	  project	  are	  threefold.	  Firstly,	  planned	  projects	  that	  were	  expected	  to	  flow	  on	  from	  the	  pipelines	  have	  been	  suspended.	  Secondly,	  the	  pipelines’	  future	  is	  much	  more	  uncertain	  and	  a	  number	  of	  commentators	  including	  Chinese	  state	  media	  have	  acknowledged	  the	  heightened	  risk	  of	  a	  dispute.	  Thirdly,	  these	  social	  interactions	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  norms	  in	  Myanmar	  around	  social	  and	  environmental	  responsibility	  for	  large	  projects.	  The	  social	  movements	  have	  been	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  reduction	  of	  ‘flow	  on’	  cooperation	  from	  the	  pipeline.	  	  The	  pipelines	  were	  expected	  to	  be	  the	  main	  feature	  of	  a	  broader	  development	  project	  between	  China	  and	  Myanmar	  that	  includes	  other	  aspects	  such	  as	  a	  special	  economic	  zone	  (SEZ)	  and	  a	  railway.	  	  The	  special	  economic	  zone	  is	  struggling	  to	  gain	  momentum	  and	  the	  planned	  railway,	  which	  would	  have	  cost	  around	  $20b	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  Larson,	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  Oil	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69	  
and	  followed	  the	  pipeline	  route,	  has	  been	  cancelled	  with	  Railway	  Minister	  Myint	  Wai	  saying	  the	  project	  has	  been	  cancelled	  ‘in	  accordance	  with	  the	  public’s	  demand’.150	  Despite	  the	  railway	  not	  progressing	  past	  the	  planning	  stages,	  NGOs	  that	  had	  worked	  on	  the	  pipeline	  were	  preparing	  campaigns	  against	  it	  using	  methods	  and	  organisational	  structures	  developed	  throughout	  the	  campaigns	  against	  the	  pipeline.151	  	  Because	  one	  of	  the	  drivers	  of	  the	  pipeline	  for	  the	  Myanmar	  government	  was	  that	  it	  would	  contribute	  to	  greater	  economic	  cooperation	  with	  China,	  this	  demonstrates	  how	  activists	  have	  contributed	  to	  a	  shift	  in	  national	  interest	  by	  reframing	  the	  pipeline.	  	  It	  is	  also	  now	  generally	  accepted	  that	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  dispute	  from	  the	  Myanmar	  government	  trying	  to	  further	  renegotiate	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  agreement	  is	  much	  higher	  due	  to	  political	  pressure	  in	  Myanmar.	  Chinese	  state	  media	  outlet	  The	  Global	  Times	  acknowledged	  this	  when	  it	  issued	  a	  stern	  warning	  to	  the	  Myanmar	  authorities.	  Acknowledging	  that	  ‘with	  Myanmar’s	  political	  transformation,	  some	  observers	  doubt	  if	  this	  pipeline	  can	  work	  smoothly	  in	  the	  future’	  the	  editorial	  warned	  ‘Myanmar	  should	  hold	  a	  serious	  attitude	  toward	  China,	  and	  Chinese	  will	  take	  (the	  Myanmar)	  people’s	  attitude	  toward	  the	  pipeline	  as	  a	  test	  of	  their	  stance	  on	  China’.	  It	  pointed	  out	  that	  ‘no	  matter	  who	  leads	  Myanmar,	  the	  leadership	  should	  ensure	  the	  enforcement	  of	  these	  agreements’	  and	  said	  ‘China	  should	  be	  determined	  to	  supervise	  Myanmar	  in	  doing	  so’.152	  A	  number	  of	  analysts	  have	  also	  predicted	  that	  this	  growing	  domestic	  demand	  and	  the	  increasing	  assertiveness	  of	  the	  population	  will	  impact	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  supply	  the	  China-­‐Myanmar	  pipelines.	  For	  example	  Kang	  Wu,	  the	  head	  of	  Asia	  operations	  at	  Facts	  Global	  Energy,	  said	  after	  the	  gas	  pipeline’s	  poor	  first	  year	  of	  performance	  ‘there	  is	  an	  issue	  with	  domestic	  consumption’	  adding	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  Backed	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‘nationalist	  sentiment	  is	  running	  high	  in	  Myanmar’.153	  	  This	  uncertainty,	  about	  the	  future	  of	  the	  pipeline	  has	  been	  a	  common	  feature	  of	  Chinese,	  Myanmar	  and	  international	  analysis.	  The	  important	  role	  that	  social	  movements	  played	  in	  this	  was	  bringing	  repeated	  attention	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  supplying	  local	  energy	  needs,	  disrupting	  the	  narrative	  about	  economic	  benefits	  and	  continually	  keeping	  the	  issue	  in	  the	  public	  consciousness.	  	  Thirdly,	  these	  processes	  have	  constructed	  and	  reproduced	  norms	  around	  social	  and	  environmental	  responsibility	  for	  large	  companies	  and	  this	  has	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  pipeline	  project.	  After	  the	  surge	  in	  protests	  at	  Chinese	  projects	  between	  2011-­‐2012	  China’s	  embassy	  released	  corporate	  social	  responsibility	  guidelines	  for	  businesses	  operating	  in	  Myanmar.	  The	  China	  National	  Petroleum	  Company	  subsequently	  spent	  over	  $20m	  in	  community	  infrastructure	  such	  as	  schools.154	  The	  Myanmar	  government	  and	  the	  CNPC	  also	  began	  to	  consult	  more	  with	  communities	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  project,	  many	  communities	  first	  heard	  about	  the	  pipelines	  when	  their	  villages	  were	  being	  surveyed	  whereas	  toward	  the	  end,	  representatives	  from	  the	  China-­‐Myanmar	  Pipeline	  Watch	  Committee	  and	  the	  Shwe	  Gas	  Movement	  were	  having	  highly	  publicized	  meetings	  with	  the	  CNPC	  and	  the	  Myanmar	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Enterprise.155	  This	  demonstrates	  that	  new	  norms	  emerged	  in	  a	  very	  short	  space	  of	  time	  and	  this	  is	  difficult	  to	  explain	  without	  looking	  to	  the	  role	  of	  social	  movements.	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Conclusion:	  Are	  national	  interests	  socially	  
constructed?	  	  Pipelines	  are	  susceptible	  to	  disputes	  because	  different	  actors	  have	  different	  interests.	  This	  thesis	  has	  sought	  to	  show	  that	  these	  interests,	  these	  meanings	  that	  the	  pipelines	  hold,	  are	  socially	  constructed	  and	  are	  therefore	  subject	  to	  change.	  When	  these	  interests	  fail	  to	  align,	  but	  the	  physical	  structure	  remains,	  is	  when	  problems	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  occur.	  	  	  To	  argue	  this	  point	  this	  thesis	  has	  sought	  to	  examine	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  transnational	  pipelines	  come	  to	  attain	  these	  meanings,	  arguing	  that	  considering	  both	  structure	  (culture)	  and	  agency	  (actors)	  is	  important.	  By	  considering	  how	  the	  pipeline	  became	  the	  best	  option	  for	  solving	  China’s	  Malacca	  dilemma	  despite	  weak	  rational	  and	  how	  new	  meanings	  emerged	  in	  changing	  social	  circumstances	  in	  Myanmar,	  it	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  state’s	  interests	  are	  not	  natural	  or	  a	  rational	  response	  to	  international	  forces	  but	  are	  borne	  out	  of	  domestic	  cultures	  and	  driven	  by	  particular	  agents.	  	  As	  such	  this	  thesis	  has	  waded	  into	  the	  debate	  about	  where	  national	  interests	  come	  from	  generally.	  According	  to	  realists	  and	  neoliberals,	  states	  have	  natural	  interests	  because	  of	  their	  size,	  location	  and	  capabilities.	  Constructivists	  disagree,	  they	  see	  interests	  as	  the	  result	  of	  ideas	  about	  the	  self	  and	  the	  world.	  	  Myanmar’s	  changing	  attitude	  towards	  the	  pipeline,	  and	  toward	  major	  Chinese	  projects	  generally,	  demonstrates	  how	  social	  and	  political	  change	  can	  impact	  on	  national	  priorities.	  In	  justifying	  the	  subject	  matter	  in	  his	  book	  on	  the	  culture	  of	  national	  security	  Peter	  Katzenstein	  points	  out	  that	  in	  order	  to	  prove	  the	  usefulness	  of	  social	  explanations	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  ‘meet	  the	  reigning	  paradigms	  on	  their	  preferred	  ground’.156	  	  Oil	  and	  gas	  generally,	  and	  transnational	  pipelines	  in	  particular,	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invoke	  images	  of	  great	  power	  geopolitics,	  calculations,	  grand	  strategy	  and	  rational	  choice.	  By	  trying	  to	  provide	  a	  constructivist	  explanation,	  this	  paper	  has	  attempted	  to	  show	  the	  broad	  explanatory	  power	  of	  the	  approach.	  This	  thesis	  also	  highlights	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  actors	  in	  explaining	  international	  events.	  In	  Myanmar,	  social	  movements	  have	  been	  important	  actors	  in	  shaping	  national	  interests	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  have	  been	  in	  China.	  States	  are	  not	  black	  boxes	  as	  realists	  would	  have	  us	  believe	  and	  it	  is	  important	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  what	  is	  going	  on	  inside	  them	  to	  understand	  their	  behavior	  	  The	  social	  processes	  around	  the	  pipelines	  also	  demonstrate	  what	  constructivists	  call	  the	  mutual	  constitution	  of	  structure	  and	  agency.	  In	  China,	  a	  culture	  of	  insecurity	  was	  reproduced	  by	  media,	  academics	  and	  leadership	  in	  the	  search	  for	  solutions	  to	  the	  ‘Malacca	  dilemma’.	  In	  Myanmar,	  changing	  social	  structures	  allowed	  new	  agents	  to	  contest	  the	  pipelines	  meaning,	  in	  the	  process	  altering	  the	  energy	  culture	  in	  Myanmar	  by	  challenging	  dominant	  practices	  and	  setting	  new	  norms	  around	  local	  ownership	  of	  resources	  and	  the	  social	  and	  environmental	  responsibilities	  of	  business.	  	  	  By	  using	  a	  unit	  level	  approach	  this	  paper	  has	  paid	  attention	  to	  the	  domestic	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  international	  in	  understanding	  where	  state	  interests	  come	  from.	  Another	  large	  body	  of	  constructivist	  research	  has	  focused	  on	  how	  international	  structures	  constitute	  states	  and	  this	  would	  be	  another	  approach	  to	  examining	  this	  subject.	  For	  example	  one	  could	  ask	  questions	  about	  how	  states	  come	  to	  value	  such	  goals	  as	  economic	  growth	  or	  how	  activists	  are	  constituted	  with	  beliefs	  about	  human	  rights	  and	  environmental	  protection.	  The	  fact	  that	  many	  of	  Myanmar’s	  activists	  were	  exiled	  would	  make	  for	  a	  fascinating	  study	  of	  the	  latter.	  Thus	  the	  international	  is	  worth	  considering	  but	  it	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study	  to	  do	  both.	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This	  case	  study	  nonetheless	  makes	  for	  a	  compelling	  case	  as	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  understanding	  the	  domestic	  sources	  of	  state	  interests.	  Viewing	  pipelines	  as	  social	  as	  well	  as	  material	  constructs	  can	  shed	  light	  on	  why	  pipelines	  are	  built,	  why	  some	  are	  successful	  and	  why	  others	  fail.	  Simply	  put,	  ideas	  matter.	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